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Eminent domain receives enormous amounts of scholarly and
popular attention, and for good reason—it is a powerful form of government coercion that cuts to the heart of ownership. But a mirrorimage form of government coercion has been almost entirely ignored:
forced ownership, or “forcings.” While legal compulsion to begin or continue ownership is neither entirely unstudied as an academic matter
nor entirely unprecedented as a doctrinal matter, the category lacks a
unified treatment. Because coercively imposed ownership can substitute
for other forms of government coercion, forcings deserve attention, even
if they will rarely dominate other alternatives. Attending to forcings as
a conceptual possibility reveals their kinship with existing features of
law and highlights one of ownership’s most essential moves: delivering
actual outcomes, and not just their expected value equivalents. Unpacking the considerations that might prompt law to impose ownership on
unwilling parties points the way to alternatives short of full-strength
compelled ownership. The analysis also suggests an additional domain
of government action—“relievings”—for unburdening owners of unwanted property.
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INTRODUCTION
Takings, or involuntary terminations of ownership, have a widely
ignored logical counterpart: involuntary impositions of ownership, or
“forcings.” Although legal doctrines of long standing sometimes compel
people to own or to continue owning property,1 the phenomenon of
compelled ownership remains undertheorized. This Article takes on this
neglected conceptual category. Attending to forcings generates important theoretical and policy payoffs, including the possibility that
compelled ownership could substitute for or augment other forms of
government coercion, such as eminent domain.
Consider blighted urban properties that have been vacated by
defaulting owners and neglected by mortgagees. Cities like Richmond,
California, have controversially pursued the possibility of using eminent
domain to keep owners in possession.2 But the ends of local governments
facing the risk of foreclosure blight might also be achieved by requiring
someone—perhaps the lender, perhaps a party developing an adjacent
parcel—to step up to the plate of ownership when the owner in possession decamps. More broadly, some of the land assemblies currently pursued through eminent domain could instead be created by requiring
existing owners to expand their holdings if they wish to stay in place.
Forced ownership might also be used remedially, or as a form of prospective land use control, to compel owners to absorb responsibility for the
areas that they impact.
The idea of pressing ownership on an unwilling party might seem
like an obvious nonstarter for at least two reasons. First, one might think
that an unwilling owner will necessarily be a low-valuing owner, and
hence an objectively bad owner. If the point of property is to get
resources into the hands of the highest-valuing user, forcings seem to
push in exactly the wrong direction. Second, the interference with personal autonomy associated with forced ownership might seem so great as
to make forcings a normatively toxic idea, as well as a political impossibil1. See infra Part I.A (providing examples).
2. Richmond’s plan, known as Community Action to Restore Equity and Stability
(CARES), contemplates resort to eminent domain to acquire certain underwater loans for
purposes of effecting principal reductions. See Frequently Asked Questions, Richmond
CARES, http://www.richmondcares.com/content/faqs (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited September 9, 2014) (“If the banks are unwilling to sell us the loans,
then eminent domain will be considered.”); see also Shaila Dewan, A City Invokes Seizure
Laws to Save Homes, N.Y. Times (July 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/
business/in-a-shift-eminent-domain-saves-homes.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (reporting on Richmond’s plan). The plan quickly attracted controversy and
spawned litigation. Appeals from a federal district court ruling that an investors’ challenge
to the plan was unripe have recently been dropped. See Sam Forgione, Investors Withdraw
Appeals Against California Eminent Domain Plan, Reuters (May 16, 2014, 8:29 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/17/us-mortgages-investing-eminentdomain-idU
SBREA4G00A20140517 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that investor
group expressed intent to refile appeal if Richmond went ahead with its plan).

1300

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114:1297

ity. The reactions to the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act
(as well as to the more ominous prospect of forced broccoli purchases)
suggest intense popular resistance to forced acquisition of unwanted
things.3
These points are undermined by the fact that the law already compels ownership through a variety of means, from remedies for conversion
and accession to limits on abandonment. Far from being alien or
unprecedented, doctrines that produce and sustain unwanted ownership
are threaded throughout the law.4 Of course, ownership is rarely foisted
on parties out of the blue; rather, it is bundled with some earlier act or
omission—often, an earlier choice to undertake some form of voluntary
ownership. These observations lead to two lines of inquiry that are pursued here. First, what considerations would prompt the law to impose
ownership, as opposed to a monetary obligation, on an unwilling party?
Second, what normative justifications and limits govern the bundling of
ownership obligations with earlier choices?
Examining existing forms of unwanted ownership directs attention
to one of property’s most essential moves: providing a vehicle for delivering actual outcomes rather than their expected value equivalents. This
core feature of the ownership strategy has implications for information
costs, risk allocation, and incentive alignment. Social benefits thus may
be uniquely achieved through ownership itself. Although these benefits
can usually be realized by encouraging willing ownership, as through
subsidies, such inducements may be insufficient where a given party
occupies a monopoly position with respect to a strongly complementary
resource or property interest.
The fact that forced ownership can advance social goals does not, of
course, complete the case for it. As with takings, forcings can selectively
impose burdens that should in fairness be spread across society.5 And, as
with takings, baseline questions quickly emerge when assessing the sorts
of uncompensated burdens that individuals should be made to bear.
That compensation could be used in tandem with forcings presents
untapped possibilities even as it introduces questions about the adequacy
3. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-398, 11-400), 2012 WL 1017220, at *13 (statement of
Scalia, J.) (asking whether reasoning supporting required purchase of health insurance
would also justify forced purchase of broccoli); see also James B. Stewart, How Broccoli
Landed on Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. Times (June 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/06/14/business/how-broccoli-became-a-symbol-in-the-health-care-debate.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on Justice Scalia’s question and tracing
roots of broccoli analogy).
4. See infra Part I.A (providing examples).
5. Cf. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (“The Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just
compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.”).
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(and indeed commensurability) of compensation that mirror those
found in the takings arena.
Recognizing the category of forcings also suggests an additional
domain for governmental action, termed here “relievings.” As the name
suggests, a relieving involves the government removing burdensome and
unwanted ownership from an erstwhile owner and either retaining ownership itself or imposing ownership on a third party. Those who find
forcings to be normatively objectionable should be particularly interested
in relievings, because the failure to engage in relieving often effectively
produces a type of forcing—forced retention. Consider again defaulting
mortgagors who have vacated the premises and wish to relinquish ownership, but cannot legally do so. The relevant policy question is not whether
the government should force someone to own the property in question,
but rather whom it shall force to take on that role.
The analysis here connects to several bodies of prior literature.
Forced acquisition equates to the exercise of a put option, a move that
has received attention in the literature on entitlement configuration.6
The compelled continuation of ownership has been examined in the
context of legal limits on abandonment7 and destruction.8 Weaker forms
of pressure to begin or continue ownership can be found in many other
legal features that have received academic treatment, from limits on free
alienability to legal requirements that owners accept certain property
bundles on an all-or-nothing basis.9 Finally, forcings bear a family resem6. The idea that the law chooses both how to allocate entitlements and how to
protect them was famously developed in Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089
(1972). Subsequent work analogized certain ways of configuring entitlements to financial
options. See Ian Ayres, Optional Law 14–17 (2005) (reviewing development of option
analogy in legal scholarship). In finance, a call option gives the option holder the right
but not the obligation to buy a stock at a specified price; a put option does the reverse by
giving the option holder the right but not the obligation to sell a stock at a specified price.
E.g., Richard A. Brealey et al., Principles of Corporate Finance 503–05 (10th ed. 2011).
Translated into the realm of legal entitlements, a put option would be a property interest
that one has the power to force another party to buy. See, e.g., Ayres, supra, at 15 (“[P]ut
options give rise to ‘forced purchases.’”); Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements,
78 Cornell L. Rev. 822, 854 (1993) (describing put option as type of “Reverse Liability
rule”).
7. See generally Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 Mich. L.
Rev. 191 (2010) [hereinafter Peñalver, Illusory Right] (exploring legal limits on
abandonment); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 355
(2010) [hereinafter Strahilevitz, Right to Abandon] (examining common law prohibitions
on abandoning real property in light of other facets of abandonment law).
8. See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 Yale L.J. 781
(2005) (examining and critiquing limits on right to destroy).
9. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1374 (1993)
[hereinafter Ellickson, Property] (noting some legal rules “deter destructive
decompositions of property interests”); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private
Property, 108 Yale L.J. 1163, 1173–82 (1999) (examining legal rules limiting
fragmentation of property); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of
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blance to “givings,” which have been previously analyzed as a
counterpoint to takings.10 This Article draws on these disparate strands to
provide a unified treatment of a topic that has received surprisingly little
attention: the use (and misuse) of governmentally compelled ownership
of real and personal property.
The analysis proceeds in five Parts. Part I examines existing instances
of unwanted ownership, broadly construed. Part II traces possible rationales for requiring parties to begin or continue ownership. Central to this
discussion is an understanding of why ownership that is viewed as individually undesirable might nonetheless be viewed as socially desirable.
Part III charts where forcings fit into a broader understanding of property ownership and state power. Part IV narrows the normatively plausible range of forced ownership by detailing how less coercive approaches
(including ones that do not involve full-fledged possessory ownership)
could achieve many of the goals of forced ownership. Part V then turns
to the domains within which forcings (and relievings) appear to hold the
most promise and examines doctrinal and theoretical issues surrounding
their use.
Before beginning, a few words about scope are in order. This piece
examines the compelled ownership of real property and, to a lesser
extent, personal property. Although forcings involving services and benefits also present important issues,11 this Article focuses on the way in
which the ownership of physical things simultaneously empowers owners
Property, in Ethics, Economics, and the Law: NOMOS XXIV 3, 15–16 (J. Roland Pennock
& John W. Chapman eds., 1982) (discussing legal “restrictions on decomposition of
titles”). See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1403
(2009) [hereinafter Fennell, Alienability] (exploring how alienability might be adjusted to
address strategic behavior); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of
Property Rights, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 931 (1985) (examining varieties of and rationales for
inalienability).
10. Past work has emphasized that governmental actions confer benefits on some
parties even as they impose burdens on others, and that givings as well as takings therefore
deserve attention. See generally Windfalls for Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and
Compensation (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds., 1978) [hereinafter
Windfalls for Wipeouts] (collecting contributions on this topic); Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 Yale L.J. 547 (2001) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky,
Givings] (developing framework for “givings” mirroring that of “takings”). However,
because this work has focused on recapturing windfalls through the imposition of
monetary charges rather than the offloading of unwanted possessory interests, it has not
fully engaged with the concept of “forcings” as developed here.
11. For example, restitution, although strictly limited in scope, can be understood
within its operative domain as the forced purchase of benefits that have been conferred on
unconsenting parties. See, e.g., Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability
for Unrequested Benefits, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 189, 195–98, 205–09 (2009) (discussing limits
on restitution and proposing expansion of the doctrine). Insurance purchases are often
compelled as well. Steven Plitt et al., 2 Couch on Insurance § 19:5 (3d ed. 2010) (“Most, if
not all, jurisdictions have compulsory insurance laws which mandate that those engaged in
particular activities have insurance.”). More broadly, the government forces the purchase
of various bundles of services through taxation.
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to manage inputs and exposes them to the risk of actual outcomes.12
Parts of the discussion will reach nonpossessory land use rights, but the
analysis places primary emphasis on possessory interests in property,
which generate outcomes over time.13
I. UNWANTED OWNERSHIP
The conceptual category of forcings has at its core ownership that is
unwanted by the owner herself. This Part examines existing instances of
unwanted ownership, broadly construed. To be sure, many of these
examples do not readily lend themselves to the label of “forced ownership”; the unwanted ownership interest follows (or is even generated by)
some voluntary choice. This overinclusion is intentional. The point is not
that the law is rife with ownership that is compelled in a strong sense, but
rather that unwanted ownership is accepted and even embraced in many
legal contexts. Establishing this point sets the stage for Part II’s inquiry
into the purposes of ownership that is aversive (that is, unattractive or
undesirable) to the owner herself.
Section A presents a number of examples organized around the two
basic ways in which unwanted ownership arises—through unwanted
acquisition and through unwanted retention. Section B lays out the
reasons that ownership might be aversive. Section C distills lessons about
the category of unwanted ownership and confronts a definitional puzzle
about its boundaries.
A. Existing Examples
How might people end up in unwanted relationships with property?
In a purely chronological sense, there are two possibilities: The person
did not want to become an owner in the first place (“unwanted acquisition”), or she initially desired ownership but soured on it later
(“unwanted retention”).
1. Unwanted Acquisition. — Unwanted acquisition sometimes comes
about through the direct imposition of a legal remedy, or through a contractual or statutory obligation that would enforce such a remedy. In
other cases, an unsought (but unrebuffed or unrebuffable) transfer from
another party or a natural event produces a legally enforceable ownership obligation. This section takes up these categories in turn.
12. It is possible that some forms of intellectual property operate similarly, although
this Article does not take up that question.
13. This emphasis on possessory rights distinguishes the analysis here from much of
the previous literature on put options. Some prior work has noted that certain legal
doctrines can force purchases of possessory interests. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 6, at 27–
28 (discussing examples of trover, mistaken improvement, and holdover tenancy).
However, the analysis has focused primarily on private choices of whether to transfer land
use rights. See, e.g., id. at 29–37 (examining potential role of put options in addressing
nuisance claims).
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a. Remedial, Contractual, and Statutory Acquisition. — Courts compel
purchases remedially in a variety of circumstances. For example, courts
may impose specific performance on an unwilling buyer in a contract to
purchase land.14 Similarly, at common law, tenants who held over beyond
the end of their lease terms could be forced to purchase a new leasehold
at the landlord’s option.15 Trover, the compelled purchase of chattel
property, is a traditional remedy for the tort of conversion.16 The shopkeeper’s warning, “You Break It, You Buy It,” may be understood as
operating in the shadow of this remedial regime.
In other instances, courts may prescribe a purchase as one of two (or
more) remedial alternatives. For example, a landowner who has suffered
an encroachment by an innocent improver may be given a choice
between forcing the encroacher to purchase the underlying land or
purchasing the improvements herself.17 A landowner who has actively
14. Imposing specific performance of a real estate contract on an unwilling seller
finds ready justification in the uniqueness of each parcel of real estate. But courts have
been willing to turn the tables and make the buyer go through with the deal too. See, e.g.,
Humphries v. Ables, 789 N.E.2d 1025, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“‘The equitable doctrine
is that the enforcement of contracts must be mutual, and, the vendee being entitled to
specific performance, his vendor must likewise be permitted in equity to compel the
acceptance of his deed and the payment of the stipulated consideration.’” (quoting Migatz
v. Stieglitz, 77 N.E. 400, 401 (Ind. 1906))); Ash Park, LLC v. Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 783
N.W.2d 294, 297 (Wis. 2010) (holding specific performance was available to sellers of real
estate and declining to require finding of no adequate remedy at law); see also Jesse
Dukeminier et al., Property 583 (7th ed. 2010) (noting “general practice” that both buyers
and sellers can obtain specific performance of real estate contracts, but observing some
recent departures from this rule—typically involving attempted enforcement by sellers).
15. See Ayres, supra note 6, at 28 (“The landlord could regain possession of her real
property or force the holdover tenant (tenant at sufferance) to rent in the future—even if
the tenant would prefer to just pay temporary damages and leave.”).
16. See id. at 27 (noting plaintiff suffering conversion of property traditionally could
choose between trover, which forces sale on converter, and replevin, which requires
converter to return property along with damages); Richard A. Epstein & Catherine M.
Sharkey, Cases and Materials on Torts 606 (10th ed. 2012) (“Originally, conversion
posited a ‘forced sale,’ under which the defendant, as the owner of the plaintiff’s property,
was now made to buy it at the full market price—even if the defendant was willing to
return it.”); see also id. (noting modern softening of remedial rule and potential
unavailability of forced sale where converted item is returned relatively undamaged).
17. Traditionally, encroached-upon owners could choose between injunctive relief
(which might require the encroacher to tear down her structure) or damages. See Pile v.
Pedrick, 31 A. 646, 647 (Pa. 1895) (offering this choice); Ayres, supra note 6, at 28
(observing damages option in Pile would have forced purchase of encroached-upon land).
Alternatively, encroachers historically would simply lose their improvements to the owner
of the underlying land—although this rule has been relaxed in modern times for goodfaith improvers. See Dukeminier et al., supra note 14, at 141 (noting modern rule might,
for instance, “forc[e] a conveyance (at market value) of land from the owner to the
improver”); see also Hardy v. Borroughs, 232 N.W. 200, 201 (Mich. 1930) (holding if
plaintiffs could establish case for equitable relief, “it w[ould] be proper to offer to
defendants by decree the privilege of taking the improvements at the fair value found by
the court, or to release to plaintiffs upon their paying the fair value of the lot found by the
court”); Matteo Rizzolli, Building Encroachments, 5 Rev. L. & Econ. 661, 667–79 (2009)
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encouraged a mistaken improvement may be treated more harshly; in at
least one case, such an owner was effectively forced to purchase the
house that had been built on his land.18 Principles of accession may
similarly require forced purchases where a party has improved raw
materials to create a new product: Either the party who took the raw
materials may be forced to purchase them, or the party who owned the
raw materials may be required to purchase the improvements.19
The bounds of remedial ownership remain unclear, however, as a
recent example illustrates. A couple in Upper Milford Township,
Pennsylvania, sued their neighbor, a registered sex offender who had
pleaded guilty to an indecent assault on their young daughter, in an
effort to force him to purchase their home.20 Predictably, the court
declined to order the forced purchase.21 But the idea of countering land
(discussing and analyzing possible rules for addressing encroachments). Where a
conveyance of the underlying land is forced, it potentially operates both as a forced sale
(from the point of view of the landowner) and as a forced purchase (from the point of
view of the encroacher)—although an innocent encroacher may welcome the opportunity
to purchase the land at its fair market value, when this option is compared with other
remedial alternatives.
18. Ollig v. Eagles, 78 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Mich. 1956) (granting lien upon
landowner’s property for “reasonable value of the improvements [plaintiff] made to this
land” with offsets for contributions made by defendant and for “reasonable rental value of
the unimproved land which [plaintiff] used for the years he occupied it”). A lien equal to
the value of the improvements might also be ordered as an alternative even where both
encroachee and encroacher acted in good faith. See Pull v. Barnes, 350 P.2d 828, 830
(Colo. 1960) (granting innocent improver right to remove cabin he had constructed, if
feasible, or to place lien on land equal to cabin’s value).
19. The general rule is that the owner of “the larger or more valuable input” gets to
keep the thing in question. Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J.
Legal Analysis 459, 466 (2009) [hereinafter Merrill, Accession]. Various rules determine
the compensation, if any, due to the other party, but one possible outcome is a forced
purchase of the other party’s input. See, e.g., Yun-chien Chang, An Economic and
Comparative Analysis of Specificatio (The Accession Doctrine), 38 Eur. J.L. & Econ.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 14), available at http://link.springer.com/content/
pdf/10.1007%2Fs10657-014-9453-0.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
compensation rule in which improver of raw materials can force original owner to pay for
improvements as “type of put-option rule”). Such a forced purchase may be accomplished
by placing a lien on the property that contains the mistakenly appropriated input. See,
e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Protecting Property Rights with Legal Remedies: A Common
Sense Reply to Professor Ayres, 32 Val. U. L. Rev. 833, 851 (1998) [hereinafter Epstein,
Protecting Property] (discussing this remedy for accession).
20. Patrick Lester, Family Sues to Force Sex Offender to Buy Their Home, Morning
Call (Mar. 16, 2013), http://articles.mcall.com/2013-03-16/news/mc-upper-milford-sexoffender-suit-20130316_1_damages-allentown-attorney-lawsuit [hereinafter Lester, Family
Sues] (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The man had returned to the neighborhood
after serving time in prison for the assault. The couple claimed that the house had lost
value as a result of his presence and that they felt under great pressure to move. Id.
21. C.Y. v. Beck, No. 2012-C-5388, slip op. at 2 n.5 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. May 9, 2013)
(order on preliminary objections) (“This Court finds it against public policy to require a
defendant to purchase a plaintiff’s property in a nuisance case as it would open the
proverbial floodgates.”); see Patrick Lester, Judge: Sex Offender Not Required to Buy
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use conflicts with purchase demands is not unprecedented. Conditional
variances in New Jersey offer neighboring landowners a choice between
suffering the grant of the variance or making a binding offer to purchase
the property for which the offending variance has been sought.22 Landowners were empowered to put the government to a similarly structured
choice—stop regulating or buy the property—under the Columbia River
Gorge National Scenic Area Act prior to its 2000 amendment.23
Sometimes the law will force a swap of property for property, effectively compelling both a sale and a purchase. For example, judicial
partition in kind simultaneously dispossesses the erstwhile cotenant of a
fractional undivided share in the whole property while forcibly conveying
a full ownership interest in a portion of the property.24 Land readjustVictim’s Property, Morning Call (May 14, 2013), http://articles.mcall.com/2013-0514/news/mc-upper-milford-oliver-beck-sex-offender-lawsuit--20130514_1_property-rightsoliver-larry-beck-varricchio (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on court’s
order on preliminary objections). This was not a surprising result; law professors contacted
by the press when the case was pending saw little chance that the court would grant the
requested relief. See, e.g., Lester, Family Sues, supra note 20 (quoting Professor Douglas
Laycock for view that forced home purchase might be part of settlement but “would be
odd as a court-ordered remedy”).
22. A variance is a land use flexibility device that enables a landowner to do
something with or on her land that would otherwise be prohibited by the applicable
zoning ordinance. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Use Regulation
22–23 (2011) (describing variances). New Jersey’s conditional-variance approach requires
neighbors who wish to block an otherwise appropriate variance to back up their
opposition with an offer to purchase the property if the variance is denied. See, e.g., Nash
v. Bd. of Adjustment, 474 A.2d 241, 245–46 (N.J. 1984) (explaining conditional variances
and holding neighbor must offer “fair market value of the property assuming that all
necessary variances have been granted”). If such an offer is made, the owners of the
property have the choice to sell at that price or keep the property without the variance. Id.
at 245. Thus, landowners who otherwise meet the criteria for a variance will receive either
a variance or a put option with a strike price equal to the fair market value of the property
with the variance.
23. Michael C. Blumm & Joshua D. Smith, Protecting the Columbia River Gorge: A
Twenty-Year Experiment in Land-Use Federalism, 21 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 201, 218–19
(2006) (examining “opt-out” provision for Special Management Areas, which required
government to either accept landowner’s bona fide offer to sell property at fair market
value or release landowner from regulations). Similarly, when a landowner succeeds on an
inverse condemnation suit, the government may choose whether to pay for the property it
has taken or withdraw its regulation. If a taking is found, however, a governmental entity
that chooses to discontinue regulating must nonetheless pay for the time slice that it has
taken in the interim. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 482
U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (“[W]here the government’s activities have already worked a taking
of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.”).
24. See Yun-chien Chang & Lee Anne Fennell, Partition and Revelation, 81 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 27, 33 (2014) (explaining judicial partition causes “[o]ne or more of the co-owners
[to] be coercively dispossessed of her undivided fractional share in the property and given
either land or money instead”). Where the partition is in kind, the cotenants receive their
shares in the form of land. See id. at 27. Judicial partition operates coercively because it
can be unilaterally sought over the objections of other cotenants. Id. at 27–28.
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ment schemes operate similarly to deliver new land in place of old.25 In
these examples, an owner may primarily object to the initial deprivation,
for which she does not feel the in-kind payment adequately compensates,
rather than to the new grant of ownership.26 Nonetheless, forced
compensation in kind via ownership may be objectionable in its own
right, if only for the costs involved in liquidating or otherwise disposing
of the interest.
Contractual or statutory provisions may require a party to buy property (or buy it back) if certain conditions occur.27 Recent examples
include “put-backs” of bad housing loans28 and efforts to make mortgagees foreclose on properties that have been vacated by defaulting
borrowers.29 Consider also provisions that turn library book borrowers or

25. Land readjustment is not well known in the United States but is used in a number
of other countries. E.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Can’t Buy Me Love: Monetary Versus
In-Kind Remedies, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 151, 188 & n.177. It provides a potential substitute
for eminent domain. See id. at 188 (describing land readjustment and comparing it with
eminent domain). Although specifics vary, the basic idea is to reconfigure a development
area while returning a portion of it to the original landowners—either in the form of land
within the development area that is at least as valuable as that which was taken away, or in
the form of shares in the redevelopment project. See Yu-Hung Hong, Assembling Land for
Urban Development: Issues and Opportunities, in Analyzing Land Readjustment:
Economics, Law, and Collective Action 3, 23–24 (Yu-Hung Hong & Barrie Needham eds.,
2007) (describing reallocation methods). For work discussing existing and proposed land
readjustment approaches, see generally Analyzing Land Readjustment, supra; George W.
Liebmann, Land Readjustment for America: A Proposal for a Statute, 32 Urb. Law. 1
(2000).
26. For example, a cotenant might prefer shared access to the entire parcel—or
rights to a share of the proceeds it could bring upon sale—to the subset of the land she
receives in a judicial-partition action.
27. These requirements effectively grant put options, which may be explicit or
embedded in contractual or legal arrangements. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 6, at 3–4
(explaining how rent-to-own arrangements embed put options, which consumers can
exercise by returning rented items); George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of
Indefinite Contracts, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1664, 1687–89 (2006) (describing and illustrating
embedded options).
28. Banks that sell loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must certify compliance
with certain underwriting standards and can be forced to repurchase the loans after the
borrower defaults if those requirements were not met. Clea Benson, Fannie-Freddie
Overseer Easing Loan Buybacks: Mortgages, Bloomberg (May 13, 2014), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/print/2014-05-13/fannie-freddie-overseer-easing-loan-buybacksmortgages.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing these loan “buybacks”
or “putbacks” and reporting on new standards governing them).
29. See, e.g., Mhari Saito, Banks Refusing to Take Back Foreclosed Properties, NPR
(Mar. 3, 2009, 2:31 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
101386052 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing possibility of legislation “that
would force lenders to completely follow through with foreclosure or forgive the
homeowner’s debt”). Mortgages in nonrecourse jurisdictions have sometimes been viewed
as granting a put option to sell one’s home back to the mortgagee at the price of the
outstanding loan balance. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and
Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 26–27 (2009) (describing “option
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video renters into owners (with payment obligations) if they fail to return
an item for a specified period of time,30 and policies or laws that allow
retail products to be returned after their purchase, effectively forcing
their repurchase.31
b. Unrebuffed and Unrebuffable Transfers. — Some unwanted acquisitions arise through transfers from other parties that were not rebuffed in
time, or perhaps could not have been successfully rebuffed at all. Gifts
require acceptance by the donee, but as long as the property is valuable,
acceptance may be readily inferred.32 Factual disputes surrounding
acceptance may erupt if ownership turns out to be a losing proposition,
as where the owner is liable for significant environmental cleanup.33
Similarly, it is generally the case today that bequests and intestate inheritances can be disclaimed, as long as this is done within a specified time
frame.34 Because refusing gifted or inherited property will often come at
model” of foreclosure). The characterization is imperfect, however, to the extent that
mortgagees can refuse to foreclose.
30. See, e.g., Redbox Rental Terms and Conditions, Redbox (June 2, 2014), http://
www.redbox.com/rentalterms (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“If you keep an item
through the maximum rental period, that item is yours to keep and Redbox will charge
you the maximum charge for that item.”).
31. For instance, “lemon laws” may require automakers to buy back a car with serious
defects that cannot be repaired after a number of attempts. See, e.g., Lemon Law, Ill. Att’y
Gen., http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/consumers/lemonlaw.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (last visited September 9, 2014) (describing consumer protections
provided by Illinois Lemon Law, including potential remedy in which “manufacturer will
buy your vehicle back from you, less the value for miles driven”). A return policy, which
effectively grants the buyer a put option to sell back the purchased goods for a refund, is a
common voluntary feature in retail sales. Hyundai offered an interesting version of this
option from early 2009 to early 2011. See Peter Valdes-Dapena, Hyundai Won’t Buy Your
Car Back Anymore, CNNMoney (Mar. 30, 2011, 12:52 PM), http://money.cnn.com/
2011/03/30/autos/hyundai_job_loss_buy_back/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing discontinued program, in which car buyers who lost their jobs within one year
of buying a Hyundai could sell it back, with Hyundai covering any difference between
outstanding loan balance on car and car’s trade-in value).
32. See, e.g., Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869, 874–75 (N.Y. 1986) (“Acceptance by
the donee is essential to the validity of an inter vivos gift, but when a gift is of value to the
donee, as it is here, the law will presume an acceptance on his part.”).
33. For example, acceptance was disputed in a case involving a dam site that turned
out to require $40,000 in repairs mandated by the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation. See Janian v. Barnes, 727 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184–85 (App. Div.
2001) (finding defendant had not expressly rejected quitclaim deed and was therefore
sole owner of dam, barring some other defense to transfer); see also Janian v. Barnes, 742
N.Y.S.2d 445, 447–48 (App. Div. 2002) (noting “$40,000 lien imposed by [Department of
Environmental Conservation] to secure the cost of repairing the dam” and finding it to
have been imposed after deed was delivered).
34. See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier & Robert H. Sitkoff, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 140
(9th ed. 2013) (explaining intestate inheritance could not be avoided at common law, but
state statutes now permit heirs as well as beneficiaries under wills to disclaim inheritances);
id. at 141 (discussing time limits for disclaiming inheritances). However, in a minority of
states insolvent heirs and beneficiaries are precluded from disclaiming inheritances. See
id. at 142 (noting circumstances in which courts will find disclaimer ineffective to avoid
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some positive cost,35 however, unrebuffed transfers can produce unwanted ownership.
Chattel property that has been dumped on one’s land without permission presents a kind of transfer that may be especially hard to
rebuff.36 Even though the initial dumping constitutes a trespass,37 once
the goods (or bads) are in place, they become the problem of the owner
of the premises as a practical matter. The theoretical ability to bring an
action against the party who abandoned the chattels38 will not translate
into a meaningful practical opportunity to force the removal of the
goods if there is no way to learn the party’s identity or whereabouts. Selfhelp may be employed to eject the offending item but only to the extent
that one can do so without trespassing on the property of someone else.
Self-help may also be used to keep such offending objects away in the
first place (through the use of high fences, posted guards, and so on) but
at some positive cost.
c. Natural Occurrences. — Natural occurrences can also produce
ownership relationships without any input on the part of the owner. The
principle of accession operates in a number of contexts to assign new
interests to holders of related interests.39 Thus, under the doctrine of
ratione soli, wild animals killed or captured on the land of the owner
become the landowner’s property.40 Accretion can deliver new increments of real estate to riparian owners.41 And the doctrine of increase
gives ownership of newborn animals to the owner of the animal’s

creditors); see also Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 Cornell L. Rev.
587, 592–601 (1989) (examining legal developments relating to disclaimers by insolvent
heirs).
35. Taking action to reject an unsought transfer always requires some amount of
effort, and there may be social as well as purely administrative impediments. See, e.g.,
Strahilevitz, Right to Abandon, supra note 7, at 365 (discussing gifts “recipient felt dutybound to keep and maintain . . . out of affection for the donor”).
36. A related situation involves the purchase of real estate that contains unwanted
chattel property. See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (providing examples).
37. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965) (“One is subject to liability
to another for trespass . . . if he intentionally . . . enters land in the possession of the other,
or causes a thing or third person to do so . . . .”).
38. See, e.g., id. § 158(c) (stating trespass liability attaches to one who intentionally
“fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove”).
39. See Merrill, Accession, supra note 19, at 462–74 (providing overview of principle
of accession in Anglo American law).
40. As Thomas Merrill explains, ratione soli is a competing principle to first
possession that was historically more dominant in England than in the United States. Id. at
470. The difference matters only to the extent that private unenclosed lands are open to
hunters, since exclusion rights would ensure that only the landowner (or those granted
permission by her) could capture or kill animals on the land. Id. Moreover, it would seem
that even a first-possession rule would permit a hunter to abandon a captured or killed
animal, making it the property of the landowner.
41. Id. at 465–66.
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mother.42 These unsought acquisitions may often be welcome, but they
could easily be aversive for particular owners. The potential burdens
associated with such rules push questions about the termination of ownership to the forefront. In a 1909 case, for example, the Georgia Court of
Appeals alluded to the law of increase in concluding that humane
destruction of a “worthless” dog must be permitted.43
2. Unwanted Retention. — Owners may find themselves holding or
using property beyond the point where it generates positive returns and
even after it begins to impose a burden. Two facets of unwanted retention are considered below: limits on terminating possession and limits on
terminating use.
a. Limits on Terminating Possession. — Recent scholarship has
explored the limits on owners’ ability to unilaterally end their possessory
relationship with property through abandonment or destruction.44
Restrictions on alienability can also make getting rid of property more
costly or difficult,45 as can features of the property itself that render it less
marketable.46 These limits are important to the category of unwanted
ownership in two ways. First, even ownership that is initially fully voluntary can become aversive over time, making blocked channels for ending
the relationship significant on their own in generating unwanted ownership.47 Second, the categories of unwanted acquisition discussed above
would have little bite were it not for blockades to disposing of property
cheaply thereafter.48
The general common law rule that fee interests in real estate cannot
be abandoned49 has significant implications, as the recent housing crisis
42. Id. at 464.
43. Miller v. State, 63 S.E. 571, 573 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909) (observing that without the
ability to destroy one’s own dog “one who found himself possessed of a worthless cur bitch
would be obliged to care for and support not only her, but also the ‘heirs of her body’ and
all her ‘lineal descendants’”).
44. See supra notes 7–8.
45. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 9, at 933–61 (examining types of alienability
limits and their effects).
46. See, e.g., Fennell, Alienability, supra note 9, at 1427–28 & n.118 (distinguishing
legal restrictions on alienability from marketability constraints, and discussing related
literature). Ownership that is hard to end due to lack of marketability or other nonlegal
barriers is sometimes described as “forced.” See, e.g., Bernard Benjamin Hoffman, Jr.,
Forced Home Ownership 1 n.2 (1967) (unpublished dissertation, Syracuse University) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (defining situation in which homeowners wish to leave
their present home but cannot do so for economic reasons as “forced ownership”).
47. For example, real estate acquired voluntarily may become unaffordable to
maintain; a puppy acquired voluntarily may grow into a rambunctious adolescent dog one
does not have time or space to care for.
48. For example, unwanted chattels dumped on one’s land or the unwanted
offspring of one’s animals would be no bother if they could be costlessly transferred out of
one’s ownership and possession.
49. See Strahilevitz, Right to Abandon, supra note 7, at 355, 359–60, 399–402
(discussing this principle).
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has shown. In the absence of any mechanism to force lenders to foreclose when mortgagors vacate the premises and cease paying,50 defaulting
mortgagors may be forced to retain ownership and the obligations that
follow from it—including liability for homeowner association dues.51 A
selling of the property is often blocked by the fact that the mortgage balance far exceeds the likely sale price.52 The inability of the homeowner to
come up with the difference locks her into ownership, unless the lender
agrees to a short sale, accepts a deed in lieu of foreclosure, or forecloses
on the property—and it may choose to do none of these.53
The ability to abandon chattel property is often also severely constrained. Specific provisions restrict the ability to abandon certain kinds
of chattel property, such as automobiles54 and animals.55 More broadly,
laws prohibit people from discarding chattels on the property of others

50. See Saito, supra note 29 (noting problem of lenders refusing to foreclose); see
also John Gittelsohn, Homeowner Associations in Need of Cash Sue to Force Foreclosures,
Bloomberg (Aug. 23, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-24/
homeowner-associations-in-need-of-cash-sue-lenders-to-force-foreclosures.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing “mortgage terminator” lawsuits brought by
homeowner associations against homeowners and lenders to collect unpaid association
dues).
51. Homeowner association dues were at issue in Pocono Springs Civic Ass’n v.
MacKenzie, 667 A.2d 233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), a leading case holding that there is no
right to abandon fee interests in real property. Id. at 235–36.
52. See, e.g., Lisa Gibbs, Why Underwater Homeowners Are a First-Time Buyer’s
Enemy No. 1, Money (June 1, 2014), http://time.com/money/2791601/why-underwaterhomeowners-are-a-first-time-buyers-enemy-1/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(observing that homeowners who will not receive sufficient sales proceeds to cover their
outstanding mortgage debt, commissions, and closing costs will be unable to sell if they
lack cash to cover the difference).
53. See, e.g., In re Cormier, 434 B.R. 222, 233 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (finding “no
authority under Massachusetts law or the Bankruptcy Code to compel [mortgagee] to take
immediate title to or possession of the Property”). But see In re Pigg, 453 B.R. 728 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 2011) (ordering sale of home where debtor had surrendered property but was
locked into ownership and liable for accruing homeowner association dues because her
mortgagee refused to foreclose or accept deed in lieu of foreclosure). Land banks offer a
possible way out of the conundrum by offering lenders a low-cost way to dispose of the
property, but may carry some drawbacks as well. See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office,
GAO-11-93, Mortgage Foreclosures: Additional Mortgage Servicer Actions Could Help
Reduce the Frequency and Impact of Abandoned Foreclosures 59–61 (2010), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1193.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(assessing land banks as possible response to abandoned foreclosures).
54. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-150(a) (West Supp. 2014) (making it illegal
to leave motor vehicle on highway or another person’s property for more than twenty-four
hours).
55. Animal protection laws vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Animal Protection Laws of the United States and Canada, Animal Legal Def. Fund,
http://aldf.org/resources/advocating-for-animals/animal-protection-laws-of-the-united-sta
tes-of-america-and-canada/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited September
9, 2014) (offering one compilation).
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without permission.56 Bans on littering provide simple examples. Although these prohibitions are usually enforced with fines rather than by
forcing the owner to continue in possession,57 an interesting example of
the latter approach can be found in one Spanish town’s tactic to address
pet waste: mailing dog feces back to the errant owners.58
b. Limits on Terminating Use. — Closely related to the unwanted
retention of property is the forced continuation of the property’s current
use. For example, rent control laws may effectively require that the property continue in rental use, especially if coupled with other limitations
that preclude repossessing the property for personal use, converting it to
any other use, or destroying it.59 Historic preservation ordinances that
prohibit the destruction of improvements on property present a similar
scenario.60 Here, keeping the underlying parcel requires keeping the
structure as well. While the entire property may be sold, the requirement
that the use remain unchanged and that the new owner engage in
upkeep of the property limits its marketability.
Land use exactions and “in lieu of” fees may similarly pressure the
continuation of existing uses. The California case of Ehrlich v. City of
Culver City offers an interesting example.61 There, the landowner had
56. See Peñalver, Illusory Right, supra note 7, at 203–07 (explaining abandonment is
only possible on someone else’s land, given inability to abandon land itself—yet no one
else’s land can be legally used for this purpose without owner’s implicit or explicit
consent).
57. See Strahilevitz, Right to Abandon, supra note 7, at 363–64 & n.22 (discussing
state and local bans on littering and dumping waste, and citing examples of statutory
provisions).
58. See Suzanne Daley, Special Delivery, of Sorts, for Wayward Dog Owners, N.Y.
Times (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/world/europe/a-specialdelivery-of-sorts-to-warn-dog-owners-in-spain.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(reporting on this enforcement campaign).
59. Such a situation was described in the petition for writ of certiorari in Harmon v.
Kimmel, a case that involved New York’s rent stabilization laws. Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 32–35, Harmon v. Kimmel, 132 S. Ct. 1991 (2012) (No. 11-496), 2011 WL
5040042, at *32–*35. The Harmons alleged that the laws worked a taking when applied to
property that was zoned only for residential use, was landmarked and hence could not be
destroyed, and could not be reclaimed for family use unless a suitable alternative rental
was provided to the tenants. Id. The Second Circuit had rejected the takings claim in
Harmon v. Markus, 412 F. App’x 420, 422 (2d Cir. 2011), and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari, Kimmel, 132 S. Ct. at 1991.
60. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1054, 1067 (5th Cir. 1975)
(upholding prohibition on destruction of cottage adjacent to landowner’s home in
historic French Quarter pursuant to ordinance designed to preserve “tout ensemble” of
Quarter); Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of
Historic Preservation, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 473, 507–08 (1981) (discussing Maher); Caroline
Connors, Controversy Clouds Future of House in Landmark District, Beverly Rev. (Aug. 5,
2014, 12:50 PM), http://www.beverlyreview.net/news/top_story/article_f022b8dc-1cc811e4-a7af-0017a43b2370.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing Chicago
landmark-district house that owners may be prohibited from destroying despite reported
mold infestation).
61. 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996).
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closed his unprofitable tennis club after a string of financial losses and
sought approval for a new use.62 The city conditioned approval on
(among other things) the owner mitigating the loss of recreational
opportunities in the community by constructing four new municipal
tennis courts or paying a $280,000 fee.63 Although the court remanded
for consideration of whether the fee was proportionate under the standard articulated in Dolan v. City of Tigard,64 it indicated that the withdrawal
of recreational uses could impose public costs for which some impact fee
might be appropriate.65
“Use it or lose it” requirements similarly constrain owners by mandating the active exercise of certain prerogatives of ownership.66 These
requirements can be understood as limiting the (temporary) disposition
of property67 and may thereby produce a type of unwanted ownership.
Adverse possession imposes a similar, if weaker, requirement that ownership be accompanied by acts characteristic of ownership (use or monitoring), if one does not wish to risk dispossession.68 Here, it is worth flagging
an important conceptual point to be revisited below:69 Casting the notion
of aversive ownership broadly enough to encompass unwanted aspects of
62. Id. at 434.
63. Id. at 434–35.
64. Id. at 448–50 (discussing standard of “rough proportionality” established by
Supreme Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), and remanding case for
further consideration under it).
65. Id. at 446 (“In short, it is well accepted in both the case and statutory law that the
discontinuance of a private land use can have a significant impact justifying a monetary
exaction to alleviate it.”).
66. See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better than Less: An
Exploration in Property Law, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 634, 650–60, 681–83 (2008) (discussing
“use it or lose it” provisions). Weaker penalties or subsidies might also be designed to
pressure property use. Recent examples include bills introduced by Philadelphia City
Council President Darrell L. Clarke to address neglected properties. See Troy Graham,
Clarke Plans Bill on Vacant Properties, Philly.com (June 8, 2013), http://articles.philly.
com/2013-06-08/news/39817627_1_vacant-properties-clarke-wall-collapse (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing bill to impose “non-utilization tax” of “10 percent of a
property’s assessed value after it had been vacant for more than a year,” with increased
taxes kicking in for additional years of vacancy); Jan Ransom, Council Bills Aim to Make
Vacant, Tax-Delinquent Properties Profitable, Philly.com (Mar. 8, 2013), http://articles.
philly.com/2013-03-08/news/37535440_1_tax-delinquent-properties-vacant-propertiesactual-value-initiative (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing mortgageforgiveness bill for residents below certain income level “who build housing [and] live on
the property for five years”).
67. See J.E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law 79 (1997) (“[T]he lesser decision to
forego using [property] for a day or a month or a year . . . is as much a disposition of the
property as is its total abandonment.”).
68. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse
Possession, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1122, 1130 (1985) (noting true owner need only
“periodically . . . assert his right to exclude others” to preserve his rights against potential
adverse possessor).
69. Infra Part I.C.
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ownership or unwanted duties attending to ownership makes the principle difficult to bound or to distinguish from ownership more generally.
B. Reasons for Aversion
Why might parties wish to avoid ownership? There are several possibilities. First, ownership might be unwanted because it comes with a price
tag—a payment obligation that exceeds what the property is worth to the
owner. Often, the owned item would be desirable if it could be obtained
for free, but not if it must be paid for at the specified rate. This is usually
the case when a put option is exercised to force a purchase.70 The
circumstances that cause the option to be “in the money” for the option
holder will typically also make the forced purchase a bad deal for the
party against whom the option is exercised. What is aversive is the price,
not the good. Similarly, many remedial applications of forced ownership—such as being required to pay for land upon which one has innocently encroached—would not be aversive (nor remedial) if the transfer
were completed for free.
Second, ownership might be unwanted because it comes with liability
exposure. Expected liability might outstrip the expected benefits that will
flow from ownership, or exposure might simply present an unacceptable
level of risk to the owner (even though ownership would on the whole
carry positive expected value).71 It is most natural to think of this exposure in terms of liability to third parties—whether governmental entities
that impose taxes or environmental cleanup obligations, collectives that
demand homeowner association fees, or individuals who suffer harms
while on one’s premises. But ownership may also expose the owner herself to uncompensated harms.72 These harms may range from small, certain, and chronic (the abiding ugliness of an unwanted gift73 or the
constant upkeep requirements of a suboptimally large lawn) to large,
uncertain, and acute (the chance of fatal exposure to dangerous property conditions).
Third, ownership might be unwanted because it will require costly
transfer or disposal efforts that exceed any value that the owner can realize
as a result.74 Some motivation must still be posited for the aversion to the
70. See supra note 6 (defining put options).
71. The latter situation will be most likely where robust insurance markets do not
exist for the risks in question. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Insurance, Risk and
Resource Allocation, in Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing 134 (1971) (analyzing
incompleteness in insurance markets).
72. See Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 167 n.26 (1970) (using concept of
liability broadly to capture impacts left to fall on victims of accidents).
73. See Strahilevitz, Right to Abandon, supra note 7, at 365 (describing “tyrannical
heirlooms”).
74. Even where the owner expects to realize positive value from the disposition of the
property, the ownership may still be unwanted relative to a monetary award to which one
might otherwise be entitled and which one might prefer. Here, the cost of disposal or
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property itself, however, to explain the desire to transfer or dispose of it.
Often the notion of liability exposure, broadly construed, will provide the
answer. Ownership carries an opportunity cost; it demands time, space,
attention, and effort that the owner might prefer to use in another way.
In some instances, a payment obligation associated with the forced purchase generates pressure to liquidate, either because that obligation has
caused a financial shortfall, or because the owner does not want to bear
the investment risk associated with holding onto the property.
Finally, ownership might be aversive for reasons relating to autonomy
or personhood. The things that one owns are in some sense an extension of
the self and constitutive of one’s identity.75 Just as having personally
significant property wrested away can interfere with a person’s selfdefinition, so too can having unwanted things thrust upon her.76 Liability
exposure is one reason that people might not wish to be personally associated with things. But the objection to ownership may go deeper, given
the potential for people to identify with the things they own and hence
with the harms that they inflict.77 Property holdings can also clash with
one’s sense of self. Consider, for example, a property owner in the
American South who discovers upon clearing her rural tract that it contains an abandoned bus from the mid-twentieth century marked with
segregated seating instructions.78 This difficult-to-remove bus may
become a source of shame to the landowner who wants no association
with its racist message. Indeed, the effects of repugnant things may linger
even after they are physically removed.79

transfer represents the cost of transforming the less preferred in-kind item into the
preferred currency of cash.
75. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, The Value of Ownership, 9 J. Pol. Phil. 404
(2001) (examining connections between ownership and identity).
76. See, e.g., Penner, supra note 67, at 79 (“One ought not to be saddled with a
relationship to a thing that one does not want . . . .”); Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra
note 10, at 602 (noting interference with autonomy inherent in forced purchases).
77. Meir Dan-Cohen illustrates this point using an example in which a person whose
vase blows out a window and injures a passerby feels a sense of responsibility for the event,
even though she was not at fault. Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of
the Self, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 959, 979–81 (1992).
78. See Jodi A. Barnes & Carl Steen, Archaeology and Heritage of the Gullah People:
A Call to Action, 1 J. Afr. Diaspora Archaeology & Heritage 167, 201 fig.11 (2012)
(including photograph showing segregated seating notice inside bus abandoned on rural
property near Edgefield, South Carolina).
79. A powerful example is related in Paul Auster’s memoir. He describes moving into
a house and discovering some boxes of books that had been left behind by the previous
owners. Paul Auster, Winter Journal 90 (2012). To his disgust, he finds that the collection
includes pro-Nazi tracts and a volume defending anti-Semitism. Id. at 90–91. He hauls the
books to the town dump, but their taint remains, ultimately forcing him to move out. As
he explains, addressing his former self: “It wasn’t possible to live in a house with such
books in it . . . . [B]ut even after you got rid of the books, it still wasn’t possible to live
there. You tried, but it simply wasn’t possible.” Id. at 91.
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C. Taking Stock
This brief tour of existing forms of unwanted ownership has established that the phenomenon exists: Sometimes people do not want the
things they own. Their reasons may be idiosyncratic or personal and will
not necessarily track the asset’s market value.80 The discussion above has
also established that the law not only tolerates the existence of unwanted
ownership but also actively produces it through a variety of doctrines.81
However, the pattern of examples suggests that certain features tend to
accompany observed instances of unwanted ownership. Taking note of
these features will help to develop the basis and limits of forced
ownership.
First, ownership is rarely forced in a full and permanent sense, insofar as it is usually possible to avoid it by incurring some cost or paying
some penalty. Even if the law purports to force ownership without any
escape hatch, compelled possession is more difficult and unusual to
enforce injunctively than compelled nonpossession. This asymmetry
makes it likely that only financial responsibility would follow from shirking the duties of ownership.82 Ownership avoidance opportunities, whether de jure or de facto, are significant. They help to mitigate the costs to
unwilling owners of unwanted ownership, but they also reduce the
benefits that society can realize through such (attempted) compulsion.
Second, unwanted ownership typically follows some earlier, identifiable choice (often, the choice to enter into some desired ownership relationship). This makes it possible to recast unwanted ownership as a
wanted ownership bundle that merely contains some aversive elements—
as ownership generally does. Limits on abandonment offer a clear example.83 By becoming an owner in the first instance, one has effectively
signed up to remain an owner until one can find someone else to accept
the job; ownership today is bundled with ownership tomorrow. Ownership that begins involuntarily can also be characterized as a bundled
choice, insofar as the ownership obligation is tied to some earlier decision that might be characterized as voluntary—whether to obtain some
other ownership interest (such as the mother of the animal one now
owns against one’s will), or to engage in some act or omission for which
ownership follows remedially or by operation of law.

80. See supra Part I.B (discussing reasons why ownership might be aversive).
81. See supra Part I.A (detailing examples of legally imposed ownership).
82. The informal abandonment of real property by a judgment-proof owner may be
understood in this way, even though true abandonment is a legal impossibility. Similar
points have been made in critiquing the distinctions among property rules, liability rules,
and inalienability rules pioneered in Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 6. See, e.g., Dale A.
Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral, 83 Va. L.
Rev. 837, 852–53 (1997) (observing that Calabresi and Melamed’s “rules” governing
transfers of entitlements may be broken).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 49–58 (discussing these limits).
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These observations make it hard to pin down when we are dealing
with a case of involuntary ownership, as opposed to just ownership. Consider the law of increase, which makes the offspring of one’s female animals one’s own. If circumstances exist in which an owner, Owen, would
prefer not to be the owner of a newborn calf recently born to his cow
Bossy, can we say that the law has forced ownership of the calf on Owen?
On one account, yes: The ownership came unbidden and is (by
hypothesis) aversive. On another view, though, Owen voluntarily acquired Bossy (or perhaps voluntarily acquired Bossy’s mother) and
thereby accepted the incidents of owning Bossy—one of which is owning
Bossy’s offspring.84 Owning Bossy’s calf may be an aversive aspect of
owning Bossy, but is it any different from being forced to buy food for
Bossy, or “owning” the results of damage that Bossy causes if she strays
onto someone else’s property? Is Owen forced to be an owner (of the
calf), or is Owen just forced to accept the responsibilities that naturally
go with ownership (of Bossy)?85
There is no obvious answer without resort to external principles
about what ownership should entail. Property mavens will notice that this
inquiry is the flip side of the baseline problem that emerges in regulatory
takings contexts: When owner Olive is prohibited from expanding her
cottage, which is located on wetlands, has something been “taken” from
her, or is the law instead merely recognizing the inherent limits on her
title?86 The questions quickly devolve into normative ones. It is always
possible to trace the imposition of an unwanted element of ownership to
84. Merrill similarly observes that one might characterize accession “not [as] a
principle about the initial acquisition of property rights so much as a principle about the
scope of property rights already acquired.” Merrill, Accession, supra note 19, at 481.
However, he resists this interpretation on the ground that the added property interests
(such as baby animals) seem “most naturally regarded as being separate or distinct from
the thing that supplies the basis for accession.” Id.
85. In other words, where are the natural or logical seams in ownership located?
Eduardo Peñalver explores one aspect of this question in observing that one can
unilaterally abandon the benefit (though not the burden) of a servitude on land, since
this does not mean walking away from obligations one has taken on. Peñalver, Illusory
Right, supra note 7, at 212. He compares the case of fee ownership for which no
abandonment is available:
When ownership is conceived of as a social practice permeated by obligation, all
property labors under a sort of servitude for the benefit of the communities in
which the property is situated . . . . And, just as the owners of servient estates
cannot unilaterally walk away from the obligations imposed by servitudes, the
unilateral abandonment of property, especially land, is equally problematic.
Id. at 213. This analysis suggests that ownership is an undivided and eternal whole that
cannot be temporally broken at a point of the owner’s (unilateral) choosing. Rather, the
owner must make an appropriate deal with some third party to accept the associated
burdens. Yet this still does not determine the content of those burdens—for that, one
must resort to some external normative theory.
86. Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 10, at 612–14 (discussing baseline
issues in charging for givings as well as paying for takings).
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some prior voluntary act, but when do these linkages or bundlings
become impermissibly attenuated or coercive?
I will return to this issue of bundling below.87 For now, an observation suffices: It is no accident that the existing examples of unwanted
ownership tend to involve relatively tight causal connections between
earlier choices and later ownership obligations. Without a theory of forcings to rely on—one that might include the prospect of compensation—
ownership is unlikely to be imposed except in instances where the associated burdens appear normatively justified. These are likely to also be circumstances in which the resulting ownership bundles appear coherent.
II. WHY FORCE OWNERSHIP?
Why would the law ever force an individual to start or maintain an
ownership relationship that the individual herself did not find desirable?
At first blush, the question has an obvious answer. If ownership makes a
party responsible for making payments, accepting liability, or bearing the
costs of disposal or transfer, the social interest in imposing it over the
owner’s wishes might seem self-evident. But on closer inspection, the
choice of mandating ownership requires more explanation. Section A
makes some observations about the “ownership strategy” and how its
consequences vary from those produced by a system of damage payments. Section B turns to some reasons why society might prefer to
impose ownership.
A. The Ownership Strategy
Henry Smith has helpfully focused attention on the “exclusion strategy” that property rights typically employ.88 Boundary exclusion creates a
protected realm in which an owner can access resources free of outside
invasion, and within which she can use self-help to keep her own impacts
inside and those of others outside.89 The exclusion strategy works in tandem with governance strategies that help to protect the outside world

87. Infra Part V.B.2.
88. See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719, 1755–
56 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property Rules] (explaining how exclusion strategy operates
and distinguishing it from governance).
89. See id. at 1755 (“Within this zone of protection, owners have the choice of how
to invest in or consume the asset.”); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts,
116 Yale L.J. 1400, 1446 (2007) [hereinafter Fennell, Half-Torts] (observing “owner’s
broad control over a spatial area” enables her “to prevent her own onsite activities from
producing risks that extend beyond the property’s borders”); Thomas W. Merrill, The
Property Strategy, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2061, 2066 (2012) [hereinafter Merrill, Property
Strategy] (outlining “the property strategy,” which focuses on “the nature of the
prerogatives given to those called owners”).
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from the activities of the property owner, and vice versa.90 For example,
property’s exclusion strategy allows a factory owner to place a ring fence
around the plant to protect widgets from being spirited away, while the
complementary governance strategy imposes liability for pollution that
spills over the property line.91
This influential picture of property is useful but incomplete. Ownership also, and crucially, involves a certain allocation of risk.92 To own
something is to bear outcomes—outcomes that may be influenced only
probabilistically by one’s own inputs.93 Exclusion backed by governance
allows owners to construct and control the environments in which they
invest inputs and realize outcomes, reap and sow. But risk remains. As a
result, owning outcomes (the actual crop, say) is a very different thing
than being directly assigned expected outcomes (the expected value of the
crop). The difference usually goes unnoticed because owners self-select
into property ownership when they find the risks worth bearing and leave
ownership when this is no longer the case. With freely alienable and
marketable property that is protected by property rules, an owner can
choose at any time whether to select actual outcomes (become or remain
an owner) or expected outcomes (cash out now).
There are two situations where the difference between expected
outcomes and actual outcomes is starkly presented. One is when ownership is terminated involuntarily, as through eminent domain. The other
90. See generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S453 (2002) (describing and analyzing these
two strategies).
91. See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1691, 1718
(2012) (using trespass and nuisance to illustrate exclusion and governance, respectively).
92. To be an owner is to be the residual claimant for whatever aspects of a resource
have not been parceled out to others. E.g., Smith, Property Rules, supra note 88, at 1795–
97. Ownership, then, should be assigned based on the ability to control those sources of
variance. See Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 78 (2d ed. 1997) (“A
party is expected to assume more of the variability, that is, become more of a residual
claimant as its effect on the mean outcome increases.”). However, given imperfect
insurance markets, there will typically remain additional sources of variance that are not
under the owner’s control but that nonetheless influence the outcomes she will
experience.
93. Smith recognizes the significance to property ownership of the ability to place
and collect on bets, such as the possibility that a piece of land will become a future tourist
destination. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va.
L. Rev. 965, 984 (2004) (giving this example and observing “property protection allows the
owner to bear the consequences of this bet on the future”); Smith, Property Rules, supra
note 88, at 1729 (“Ownership concentrates on the owner the benefits of information
developed about—and bets placed on—the value of the asset.”). But because Smith
assumes that the bets are voluntarily undertaken, he does not address the possibility that
ownership could create aversive risk arrangements. Likewise, Merrill’s explication of “the
property strategy” recognizes the incentive effects that accompany making the owner the
residual claimant, but devotes little space to downside risk exposure. See Merrill, Property
Strategy, supra note 89, at 2092–93 (suggesting insurance and social safety nets largely
address concerns about risk).
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is when ownership is forced. Where ownership is cut short, one loses the
right to try one’s hand at getting actual outcomes that exceed expected
outcomes—although one may also be saved from the risk of getting
actual outcomes that are lower than expected outcomes.94 Forced ownership effectuates a different swap: One is made to bear actual outcomes,
rather than simply being charged with expected outcomes. It is a different thing to pay damages (even “permanent damages” designed to cover
projected future impacts) than it is to be exposed to ongoing liability.
The two situations present different risk profiles and incentive structures.
It is easier to grasp what the ownership strategy does by examining
its metaphorical application to a different area of law—tort. Arthur
Ripstein has developed a concept of “risk ownership” that makes people
owners (in some sense) of the risks they create by acting in the world.95
On this view, actors are properly saddled with (some) actual outcomes
that flow from their behavior, not the expected value of the risks they
generate.96 This, after all, is what it means to be an owner.
The bite of this approach can be seen in its treatment of “moral
luck.”97 As a result of sheer chance, identical inputs (equally inattentive
driving, say, or leaving a baby unattended in a bathtub for an equal
amount of time) can produce dramatically different outcomes (a catastrophic accident in one case, and nothing at all in another).98 Even
though the human inputs may be morally equivalent in the two sets of
cases, the law treats the respective actors very differently.99 The negligent
driver or caregiver who causes an accident will suffer severe consequences, while her equally culpable doppelgänger who luckily avoids
causing harm walks away unscathed.100 Viewing the generator of a risk as
94. The statement in the text assumes that expected returns get built into the fair
market value standard used to determine the adequacy of compensation.
95. Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law 53–93 (1999).
96. See id. at 72–74 (using risk ownership concept “to explain why no liability arises
for the mere imposition of risk” and noting “element of luck” involved).
97. See id (drawing this connection). For discussion of moral luck, see generally
Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in Mortal Questions 24 (1979); Bernard Williams, Moral
Luck, in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980, at 20 (1981); John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 1123 (2007); Jeremy
Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in Philosophical Foundations of Tort
Law 387 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
98. See Nagel, supra note 97, at 30–31 (“If one negligently leaves the bath running
with the baby in it, one will realize, as one bounds up the stairs toward the bathroom, that
if the baby has drowned one has done something awful, whereas if it has not one has
merely been careless.”); Waldron, supra note 97, at 387 (giving example of two
momentarily distracted drivers, one who collides with a motorcyclist and another who
proceeds without incident).
99. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 97, at 387–88 (noting moral equivalence between
two drivers who were equally careless, where only one caused an accident).
100. See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 97, at 1128 (“[W]hen one actually
considers how culpability and blame are assigned in real life, it is evident that ordinary
moral judgment is sensitive to luck.”).
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its “owner” offers a way to understand or at least normalize this apparent
anomaly. Letting outcomes (both catastrophic and benign) fall on risk
generators is arguably no more odd than leaving the upside and downside risks of a vegetable garden or a shopping development on an owner,
even though external forces will determine whether certain acts of cultivation or neglect translate into success or failure.101
The ownership concept sits uneasily in the tort framework, however,
as Ripstein recognizes.102 Tort risks are typically not bounded by exclusion rights in the way that property tends to be.103 This fact deprives
actors of control over how risks will play out104 and requires that tort law
synthesize some conceptual substitutes for physical boundaries to cabin
the scope of liability.105 Moreover, potential benefits generated when acting in the world are considerably less amenable to “ownership” under
tort law than are potential harms.106 Tort doctrines may nonetheless be

101. Cf. Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Luck, 104 Law Q. Rev. 530, 539–41 (1988)
(casting tort liability as outcome of series of gambles in which most people win more than
they lose).
102. See Ripstein, supra note 95, at 47 (noting indeterminacy of ownership “in a
world of risks”).
103. See Fennell, Half-Torts, supra note 89, at 1447 (explaining how property
boundaries grant owners considerable choice about how to contain impacts and prevent
them from spilling over onto others’ property).
104. Exclusion offers a way of controlling the background against which risks play
out and the identity and characteristics of parties exposed to the risks. For example,
members of a household without any young children can keep prescription medicines that
are not in child-proof containers out on a countertop without thereby creating any
significant risk, assuming no children are invited into the household and ordinary
exclusion measures are taken to keep neighborhood children from wandering in
unattended.
105. Doctrinal requirements like proximate cause and duty might be understood in
this way, in that they narrow down the outcomes for which one will be held responsible.
More fundamentally, negligence pares down the scope of liability based on notions of
fault; strict liability, by contrast, defines the outcomes for which one will be responsible
independent of fault. See Honoré, supra note 101, at 541–42 (explaining how strict
liability imposes “outcome-responsibility” based on risk creation). In both cases, however,
the boundaries around the outcomes one “owns” are set conceptually rather than through
physical property boundaries selected by an owner. For this reason, risk ownership
represents an interesting form of forced ownership (to the extent it is properly regarded
as ownership at all).
106. See, e.g., Porat, supra note 11, at 195–98 (noting dearth of remedies for
unrequested benefits provided to others). If all of the costs were charged to one’s account
and none of the benefits, then there would be too little engagement in activities that do
not cause expected harm on net. Indeed, one compelling rationale for limiting the scope
of liability is to account for the positive spillovers associated with everyday activities. See
Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1501,
1502 (2006) (noting duty doctrines that limit liability play a role in “encourag[ing] or
subsidiz[ing] activities that carry substantial external benefits”).
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understood as forcing ownership of a subset of risks thought to align with
the boundaries of the actor’s own benefit catchment area.107
Whether or not one views ownership as an apt metaphor in the tort
realm, actual ownership does its work not by evaluating inputs but rather
by assigning returns on activity within a designated domain, such as a
parcel of land, to the property’s owner.108 Property can be conceptualized as “a leaky bucket of gambles.”109 It delivers not a basket of expected
outcomes, but rather the outcomes themselves, over time. The bucket is
leaky and prone to sloshing, however: Not all inputs are under the
owner’s control, and not all outcomes get fully charged to the owner.
Still, ownership endeavors to achieve a reasonably well-aligned pairing of
inputs and outcomes.110 Ownership thus amounts to a container within
which outcomes are one’s responsibility, and for which one bears any
attendant risks one has not managed to offload to others.111 Other legal
rules may stretch this container to capture more outcomes that are normatively relevant or fewer that are normatively irrelevant.112 But these
same objectives might at times be pursued by extending or forcing
ownership itself.

107. See Honoré, supra note 101, at 542 (explaining that strict liability, as applied to
activities that usually generate positive returns for actors, “merely serves to surcharge on
grounds of social policy the debit side of an account which is in most instances
comfortably in credit”).
108. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text (discussing owner as residual
claimant). In a world of perfect information and costless administration, the law could tax,
subsidize, punish, and reward all human inputs directly based on their expected marginal
contributions to negative or positive outcomes. But where inputs are extremely difficult to
measure or trace, property offers a powerful alternative. See Smith, Property Rules, supra
note 88, at 1796–97 (explaining how ownership, by assigning residual claim, captures
contributions that are difficult to measure).
109. See Fennell, Half-Torts, supra note 89, at 1405, 1442–43 (developing this
metaphor).
110. Achieving a perfect alignment would be unduly costly, but property should
endeavor to charge or credit outcomes to the owner when it can do so cost effectively. See
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347, 350 (1967)
(“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization
become larger than the cost of internalization.”).
111. As the common availability of homeowner’s insurance suggests, owners need not
personally bear all risks. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1047, 1060 (2008) [hereinafter Fennell, Homeownership].
112. Land use controls designed to address cross-boundary spillovers are a primary
example. Doctrines like private necessity also adjust the prerogatives of ownership while
encouraging parties to behave toward the property of others as if they were its owner. See,
e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910) (holding boat owner
liable for damage to dock he used during storm, even though use was justified by private
necessity); Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More
Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & Econ. 553, 577–79 (1993) [hereinafter Epstein,
Holdouts] (discussing incentives in context of private necessity).
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B. Ownership’s Edge
Understanding that ownership’s basic strategy entails responsibility
for outcomes, not inputs, helps explain the motivation for forced ownership. Identifying an owner means something different from imposing a
charge: It is an answer to the question, “Whose problem is this?”113 There
are sensible reasons why the law might choose to answer that question,
rather than a series of other questions about the nature, extent, probable
solution, and expected value of the problem. The sections below offer a
set of (somewhat overlapping) rationales for requiring ownership. Taken
together, they focus on how channeling responsibility for outcomes into
particular patterns or bundles of ownership addresses information and
incentive problems.
1. Economizing on Information. — One reason for forcing ownership is
to economize on the costs of gathering and using information. Consider
trover, which requires a party who has converted the property of another
to purchase that property. It might seem at first that a damage award
would serve just as well, and indeed the remedy of replevin offers just
such an alternative.114 An advantage of forcing ownership, however, is
that it sidesteps the need to calculate damages. Payment is based on the
fair market value of the undamaged item; the transfer of the thing itself
will credit back any remaining value to the new owner.115 Disagreements
about the extent of the damage need not be entertained, nor must the
erstwhile owner bear the risk that the condition of the thing will deteriorate further as a result of additional hidden vulnerabilities (such as hairline fractures in a vase).
Consider how this approach would work in a nuisance context
involving a polluting factory: The affected property would be forcibly
transferred at its (unpolluted) fair market value to the polluters, at the
election of the current owners.116 What is notable about this solution
113. Deciding who is responsible for a problem is, of course, a normative conclusion
about who should be responsible. See Ripstein, supra note 95, at 47 (observing “talk of
people owning risks and misfortunes is simply a way of spelling out the idea expressed in
such familiar idioms as ‘that’s not my problem’” based on some normative account of
proper risk distribution).
114. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing conversion remedies).
115. As Richard Epstein explains:
Once the chattel is damaged, it is tricky to figure out what damages are needed
to make the plaintiff whole, so that the long-established election of remedy
allows the plaintiff simply to liquidate his original investment for cash. The
remedy of forced purchase requires the defendant, quite simply, to pick up the
pieces when the chattel is destroyed and to take the up and down of its value
when the chattel is taken.
Epstein, Protecting Property, supra note 19, at 850–51.
116. This is not a remedial approach to which courts have been receptive. See supra
text accompanying notes 20–21 (discussing failed attempt to force convicted sex offender
to buy home of victim’s family); see also Ayres, supra note 6, at 37 (“Courts do not award
plaintiffs remedial puts even when defendants intentionally create a nuisance.”). Even the
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from an information-cost perspective is that it does not require calculating damages in advance or returning to court over time as consequences
unfold.117 Moreover, the new single owner of the consolidated parcel will
be expected to make optimal decisions about how to coordinate conflicting land uses going forward.118
In the examples just given, the problem to which ownership was
offered as a response was relatively well defined: a damaged object, a polluted parcel. But the information-cost savings associated with the ownership strategy become even more important when the nature of the
problems coming down the pike are as yet undefined. The unknown and
unknowable nature of future problems explains the law’s unwillingness
to leave things unowned. Gaps in seisin (possessory ownership) are not
permitted for real property under the common law, and the same rule
applied to chattels until the sixteenth century.119 A likely reason was to
make sure there was always someone who was responsible for the property, to whom liability could attach if necessary.120
These rationales relate closely to the risk-bearing and incentive
aspects of ownership, which will be developed below.121 But they find
additional footing in information-cost savings by economizing on the
very task of finding out who is in a good position to bear risk or respond
to incentives. The ownership strategy farms out that entire set of problems, leaving the owner to decide what to do about them. By limiting the
ways in which people can rid themselves of both chattels and (especially)
real property, the law tries to channel property reassignment into forums
in which information costs are bearable. In the meantime, owners are
academic literature on put options in the nuisance context has generally contemplated
not the forced purchase of a possessory interest in the property, but rather the forced
purchase of, say, an entitlement to pollute. See id. at 15–16 (working through example
involving a put option for a pollution entitlement).
117. Existing work on put options in the nuisance context has focused on a different
kind of informational advantage: the capacity of the exercise of the put option itself to
reveal information about which party more highly values a given nonpossessory
entitlement, such as the right to emit pollutants. See Ayres, supra note 6, at 20–21, 25
(describing information-forcing properties of put options and call options, and
differences between them).
118. For example, the new owner of the consolidated tract will decide how and
whether to operate the factory based on which of the conflicting land uses is more
valuable. See Epstein, Holdouts, supra note 112, at 556–57 (explaining how applying
single-owner test identifies efficient results). The advantages identified in the text may of
course be overwhelmed by other drawbacks of the approach; the point here is simply to
identify what the imposition of ownership adds to the situation.
119. See A.H. Hudson, Is Divesting Abandonment Possible at Common Law?, 100
Law Q. Rev. 110, 118 (1984) (noting this history and observing “one of the bestestablished rules here was that there could be no abeyance of seisin”).
120. See id. (“A practical consequence of this [rule against abeyance of seisin] in
relation to chattels may have been that liabilities in respect of the chattels could always be
attributed to an owner or possessor.”).
121. Infra Part II.B.4.
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kept paired with their property, which reduces the costs of learning
about the property’s status.
To say that it is useful to have some owner of record does not, of
course, make a case for the current method of picking out who shall
serve in that capacity. Gaps in seisin could be prevented equally well if
unwanted property could be decisively ceded to, say, an agency of the
state.122 Where property is objectively negative in value, an auction might
be held to see who would accept the property at the lowest price.123 Some
of these approaches might be good solutions in certain contexts, as will
be discussed below.124 Yet all of them cost something to implement. Letting ownership lie where it falls has an immediate edge—saving society
the cost of identifying a better owner.
2. Dispersing Obligations. — Ensuring that land remains owned does
more than satisfy a societal sense of order. It also maintains a platform
for imposing obligations.125 While the social obligations accompanying
property ownership have received a great deal of recent attention,126
unwanted ownership pushes us to consider why these obligations would
ever be imposed in kind. Here, other aspects of the information-cost
story become relevant: the widespread information gathering and localized monitoring that dispersed private ownership facilitates.127
Pervasive private land ownership creates a web of location-specific
obligors who can be called upon to collectively accomplish large-scale

122. See Strahilevitz, Right to Abandon, supra note 7, at 394–95 (discussing civil law
countries that permit relinquishment of real property to the state).
123. See, e.g., Herbert Inhaber, Slaying the NIMBY Dragon 41–69 (1998)
[hereinafter Inhaber, NIMBY] (providing accessible account of how reverse Dutch auction
can be used to allocate bads); Herbert Inhaber, Market-Based Solution to the Problem of
Nuclear and Toxic Waste Disposal, 41 J. Air & Waste Mgmt. Ass’n 808, 812–15 (1991)
(proposing reverse Dutch auction approach for siting waste); Michael O’Hare, “Not on My
Block You Don’t”: Facility Siting and the Strategic Importance of Compensation, 25 Pub.
Pol’y 407, 438–56 (1977) (analyzing auction approaches to facility siting).
124. See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing repricing of ownership).
125. See Peñalver, Illusory Right, supra note 7, at 213 (suggesting affirmative
obligations of ownership explain common law limits on abandonment).
126. For recent examples of literature in this vein, see generally Gregory S.
Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 745
(2009); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 821 (2009); Joseph William
Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 Cornell L.
Rev. 1009 (2009). For an overview and critique of various strands in the progressive
property movement, see generally Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative
Potential of Progressive Property, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 107 (2013).
127. The law’s interest in picking out owners who are well positioned to serve such
information gathering and monitoring functions may explain, for example, the residency
and use requirements associated with the Homestead Act. See Barzel, supra note 92, at
121–23 (suggesting homesteading restrictions may have been designed “to induce settlers’
self-protection against raids where such protection was cheaper than direct protection by
the state,” and “to ensure that the land would actually be densely occupied”).
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tasks, like clearing a city’s entire sidewalk system of snow.128 Many of
these tasks could be collectively provided and the owners charged, but
giving each owner responsibility over her own location offers a flexible
and responsive system that can be scaled up or down, with duties added
or subtracted as needed.129 Significantly, such a system takes advantage of
dispersed local knowledge.130 Similarly, private measures to safeguard
property, such as deadbolts and fences, can also reduce the cost of public
enforcement (relative to a baseline in which the land is unowned or publicly owned).131 Again, the ability to engage in flexible, context-specific
measures based on local information may make private enforcement a
useful complement to public enforcement.132
The widespread localized monitoring that accompanies dispersed
private ownership also generates expectations among third parties that
help to sustain social order. Presumptively owned property may be less
likely to be vandalized or broken into, on the assumption someone is
looking after it.133 Likewise, the assumption that property is owned, and
not up for grabs, can prevent wasteful or dangerous races to establish
new ownership.134 Warding off these acts is socially desirable; in addition
to potentially dissipating the value of the property, they can have harmful
spillovers.

128. See Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2029, 2051
(2012) [hereinafter Katz, Governing] (discussing snow shoveling and other localized
duties states may assign owners).
129. See id. at 2035–39 (characterizing ownership as “an office” that “enables states
to allocate responsibility systematically and on a mass scale even as the people who hold
those offices come and go”).
130. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners, 3 BrighamKanner Prop. Rts. Conf. J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8–15), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2464545 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (emphasizing role of
local knowledge as justification for placing affirmative burdens on landowners); Merrill,
Property Strategy, supra note 89, at 2081–83 (noting property’s decentralized nature and
“ability to harness local knowledge”).
131. Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Case for Imperfect
Enforcement of Property Rights, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1927, 1935–50 (2012) (examining how
availability of public enforcement creates potential moral hazard as to private protective
measures).
132. Cf. Katz, Governing, supra note 128, at 2041–42, 2050 (giving example in which
theater assigns each person a seat and charges her with putting out any fires that break out
under that seat, thereby producing “a system of fire control for the entire theater”).
133. See Hudson, supra note 119, at 117–18 (discussing and qualifying claim that ban
on abandonment operates as “deterrent to vandalism and theft”).
134. Costly races to establish ownership are easy to envision with a first-in-time rule of
physical possession, although other methods of assigning ownership are possible. See, e.g.,
Strahilevitz, Right to Abandon, supra note 7, at 374–75 (noting “lawless-race costs” for
property abandonment); id. at 410–11 (considering alternative of granting rights to first
person to reply to online listing). Ownership protocols that are not based on establishing
physical possession could still produce deadweight losses, if less dramatic ones, as multiple
people attempt to simultaneously fulfill the requirements for ownership.
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Of course, the social harms of nonownership are not necessarily
avoided through forced ownership. People can and do vacate and
neglect their properties even if the law continues to recognize them as
owners. If they are judgment-proof, they may shirk their obligations as
owners with relative impunity.135 Similarly, dangerous and wasteful races
can be produced not only by unowned things, but also by things that an
owner offers to transfer at a below-market price.136 However, it is possible
that ownership may operate as a kind of moral suasion that causes owners to act more responsibly toward the owned item.137 Moreover, even if
individual owners fall down on the job, the assumption that dispersed,
concerned monitors are paying attention and looking out for property
may create a kind of herd immunity that pushes back disorder.138 This
rationale falls apart, however, if property neglect becomes obvious and
widespread—as might occur when involuntary ownership makes up a
significant share of observed ownership. Thus, urban areas with large
concentrations of homes that have been left vacant by their owners presumably gain little or no benefit from the fact that the homes in question
remain nominally owned.
3. Consolidating Complements. — Sometimes it is more important to
get a complementary set of property rights into the same hands than it is
135. Legal responsibility may have some effect even on the judgment-proof, insofar
as they may hope or expect to not remain so forever. Ownership also confronts owners
with the opportunity cost of failing to make valuable use of the property, where such use is
possible. Even a largely theoretical responsibility for the downsides associated with the
property might cause owners to pay attention to the upsides as well.
136. For example, the below-market pricing common on “Black Friday” has
contributed to tramplings and other outbreaks of violence. See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden
& Angela Macropoulos, Wal-Mart Employee Trampled to Death, N.Y. Times (Nov. 28,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/business/29walmart.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Joseph Serna, Black Friday Melee on Video at Georgia Wal-Mart,
Trampling in Texas, L.A. Times (Nov. 23, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/
23/nation/la-na-nn-black-friday-melee-georgia-texas-walmart-20121123 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
137. Maintaining the ownership relationship could also influence the owner’s
valuation of the thing in question, which could in turn affect behavior regarding it.
Although the nature, causes, and indeed existence of an “endowment effect” have been
the subject of extensive recent debate and study, how ownership influences people’s
valuations remains unsettled. See, e.g., Keith M. Marzilli Ericson & Andreas Fuster, The
Endowment Effect, 6 Ann. Rev. Econ. 555, 563–64, 571–72, 575 (2014) (reviewing recent
literature on this point and noting open questions). It is even less clear whether and how
such an effect would apply where the property is unwanted. Research on this issue could
carry implications for both forced acquisition and forced retention.
138. For example, a few unlocked cars or apartment doors in a sea of carefully
secured properties will be unlikely to attract casual thieves or vandals, because the returns
to trying every door are so low. Indeed, a nontrivial number of people subscribe to a “no
lock” philosophy. See Joyce Wadler, The No Lock People, N.Y. Times (Jan. 13, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/14/garden/14nolock.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (reporting on people who regularly choose not to lock doors to their homes,
including some residents of New York City and other major cities).
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to get individual components into the highest-valuing hands.139 Although
parties might be expected to voluntarily put together complementary
bundles in most cases, sometimes intervention in the form of forced
ownership plays a role.
Accession and mistaken-improver cases offer some of the simplest
and clearest examples. It is obvious that a canvas and the artwork painted
on it should end up in the same ownership, and it is clearly undesirable
to have a building straddle a property line. Because these situations present bilateral monopolies that may make it difficult for the parties
involved to negotiate solutions, unilateral transfers are likely to be attractive alternatives. Forcing one party to sell to the other is one alternative,
but so too is forcing a party to buy from the other—and the latter might
in some cases seem normatively preferable.140 Indeed, it is not uncommon to offer the encroached-upon party a choice between such remedies: Buy out or be bought out.141
Many of the ways that law assigns rights to previously unowned
resources can be understood through the lens of complementarity as
well. The law of increase and the accretion doctrine are good examples—property is added to proximate or logically related existing holdings.142 Although instances could exist in which the interests will be more
valuable if split apart,143 these are perhaps rare enough to make it efficient for the property system to assign ownership in the way that it
does.144 More generally, default property packages, which can be costly to
break apart, are arguably designed to reflect complementarities. Doctrines that pressure or encourage certain ownership patterns can often
be explained by complementarities as well. For example, conditioning a
neighbor’s right to defeat a variance on her offer to purchase the prop139. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More
Coasean, 54 J.L. & Econ. S77, S92–99 (2011) (emphasizing need to attend to content of
property packages, given positive transaction costs).
140. For example, an encroached-upon landowner who encouraged mistaken
improvements on the land might be made to buy them. See, e.g., Ollig v. Eagles, 78
N.W.2d 553, 560 (Mich. 1956).
141. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text (discussing such remedial
choices).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 39–42 (discussing these doctrines).
143. For example, a riparian landowner who gains property by accretion but whose
own plans for the property do not include access to the water might value the added
increment of land less than his neighbor would. Or, to take another example, a newborn
calf that is rejected by its mother might be less valuable in the hands of the owner of the
mother cow than under the ownership of another individual who is better positioned to
hand raise it.
144. Thanks to Kenneth Ayotte for discussions on this point. Merrill focuses on a
related aspect of complementarity: the overlap between the skills necessary to be a
successful owner of the initially acquired interest and those necessary to successfully own
the interests added later through accession. See Merrill, Accession, supra note 19, at 488–
91 (suggesting law uses past ownership of related interest as proxy for identifying fit
owner).
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erty for which the variance was sought arguably forces information about
whether complementarities are present between the neighboring properties.145 Complementarities can also explain prohibitions on the
destruction of historic properties (that is, the forced retention of certain
structures) under the tout ensemble doctrine.146
4. Aligning Incentives. — Some unwanted ownership can be understood as buttressing the self-enforcing incentive system that private property is thought to embody. A standard example of (or metaphor for) the
incentive-alignment potential of property ownership is that of reaping
where one has sown.147 Simple agrarian illustrations are popular because
they present a plausible scenario in which the benefits and burdens associated with one’s acts are confined to the physical plot one owns.148 The
farmer in the example owns her own labor and the land; property law
assigns her the crops that result from mixing these elements with inputs
that she also owns, such as seeds and fertilizer. There are no significant
externalities in the story. Whether property operates in this manner,
however, depends crucially on the way in which ownership packages are
scaled and defined.
Consider instead a “flyaway” crop that predictably lands a quarter
mile southwest of where it is sown. Here, the story does not work so well,
unless the property is redefined to include the catchment area, or the
crops themselves can somehow be associated with their sower.149 Allowing
the crop-landing zone to be owned on its own does not align incentives
(no one would bother sowing); incentives similarly fall out of alignment
if the crops stay put on the owned land but sprout noxious traveling
spores whose effects are not charged back to the owner. Property boundaries must be set in a way that produces incentive alignment, or must be
buttressed with governance structures that stand in for physical boundaries where the latter cannot realistically be employed.150 Property’s social
value, in other words, depends on package construction.
Some unwanted ownership, then, may involve elements added to a
given ownership package to better align incentives. If small properties
145. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing New Jersey’s conditional
variances).
146. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing such prohibitions).
147. E.g., Merrill, Property Strategy, supra note 89, at 2083.
148. See, e.g., id. at 2071–72 (presenting example of family farm). These examples
predominantly feature “small events,” to use Robert Ellickson’s nomenclature. See
Ellickson, Property, supra note 9, at 1327–30.
149. Cf. Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 159–60 (D. Mass. 1881) (describing usage in which
distinctive harpoon markings allowed whale to be identified with harpooning whaler,
despite use of bomb-lance technology that did not keep whale physically tethered to
whaling boat).
150. See, e.g., Smith, Property Rules, supra note 88, at 1756 (“Using fences to
modulate complex questions of use—such as proper grazing technique or optimal noise
levels—would be prohibitively costly.”); id. at 1756–57 (describing governance as “lowestcost method where stakes are high enough to require precision in delineating uses”).
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enable more cross-boundary externalities, larger properties might be
mandated, as through zoning restrictions. If short time slices of ownership lead to dealing in a present-focused way with the land, longer time
slices may be mandated, as through limits on short-term leases. If introducing rental housing or recreational opportunities into an area and
then withdrawing them will visit terrible harms on the community, then
landlords or owners of recreational facilities may be required to make
these opportunities available for a minimum period of time (even if it
means that fewer owners choose to provide those opportunities initially).
Ownership bundles may also be constructed to moderate access to
local public goods or common-pool resources. The Tiebout hypothesis is
built on the idea that procuring residential services also means purchasing a basket of local public goods and services.151 The idea of tying
ownership obligations to common-pool resource access is built into other
observed arrangements as well, including cattle “wintering rules” used in
some Swiss villages, which prohibit sending more cows to the grazing
lands than one can feed during the winter,152 and medieval commonfield arrangements that scatter individually owned farming strips within a
seasonal grazing commons.153
III. CHARTING FORCINGS
The discussion to this point has suggested why ownership that is privately unwanted might nonetheless be socially valuable. This Part examines how forcings fit conceptually into the overall scheme of private
ownership and state power. Section A examines governmental acts that
change who owns a particular piece of property, whether by coercively
taking it away from a current owner, giving it to a willing owner, forcing
it on an unwilling owner, or accepting it from an owner who no longer
wants it. Section B shows how these acts connect to existing ownership
and nonownership arrangements, which may be wanted or unwanted,
socially harmful or socially beneficial. This analysis reveals misalignments
between private and social payoffs that could be addressed through
changes in ownership or through a variety of other means. Because any
change (or nonchange) in ownership status can be accompanied by
compensation, government policy can decouple questions about whether
someone should be an owner or nonowner from questions about
whether the person deserves to bear the associated burden.
151. The Tiebout hypothesis posits that (under certain strong assumptions) people
will sort into the local jurisdictions they prefer based on the services and taxes offered by
each. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol.
Econ. 416 (1956).
152. See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons 62 (1990) (describing wintering
rules).
153. See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open
Fields, 29 J. Legal Stud. 131, 146–54 (2000) [hereinafter Smith, Semicommon Property]
(examining incentive effects of this arrangement).
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A. Takings, Givings, Forcings, Relievings
The government can reassign ownership of a given piece of property
in four basic ways: by exercising the eminent domain power (takings), by
transferring property to willing parties (givings), by compelling
ownership (forcings), or by accepting transfers of property from parties
who do not wish to own it (relievings).154 Takings, givings, forcings, and
relievings could occur alone or in various combinations as governmental
entities attempt to optimize land use. Table 1 sets out the domains within
which each of these moves would be minimally plausible as a normative
and logical matter.155 The four cells specify government actions that
would begin or end ownership for a hypothetical party, A, based on the
private and social payoffs produced by A’s ownership.
TABLE 1: DOMAINS OF GOVERNMENT ACTION

A’s Ownership Is
Privately Beneficial
A’s Ownership Is
Privately Costly

New Ownership by A Is
Socially Beneficial

Current Ownership by
A Is Socially Costly

I. GIVINGS

III. TAKINGS
(and other coercive
dispossessions)

II. FORCINGS

IV. RELIEVINGS

For concreteness, consider an individual, Ani, whose relationship to
a particular piece of property, Parcel X, may generate private benefits,
social benefits, both, or neither. The distinction between Table 1’s top
and bottom rows goes to whether Ani herself views ownership of Parcel X
as privately beneficial or costly. The question is a subjective one: The fact
that property imposes a private burden on Ani does not mean that it
would impose a private burden on another party, such as Brock. Thus,
the two rows of Table 1 correspond to a given owner wanting or not

154. There are of course many additional tools, such as taxes and subsidies, that the
government can use to influence the attractiveness of ownership. See infra Part IV.B
(discussing repricing alternatives).
155. To say that an indicated form of government coercion is minimally plausible
does not mean that it will always or often be appropriate, much less that it will always or
often be observed. Rather, these are sets of necessary conditions, which may or may not be
sufficient in a given instance to justify the use of government power. It is also obviously
possible for the government to engage in the acts named in the chart when the conditions
are not met—as where eminent domain inefficiently moves property to a lower-valuing
user. The point of the chart is not to assert that government always or only engages in
these acts when the stated conditions are met, but rather to suggest that these conditions
would form a minimum predicate for an appropriate exercise of the specified
governmental power.
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wanting the property, respectively.156 Property with a negative expected
value would be unwanted, and hence regarded as privately costly, by
almost everyone—at least in the absence of a compensatory transfer
payment. But property need not have a negative expected value to be
unwanted by particular parties; there may be autonomy or personhood
issues at stake, or simple risk aversion.157
Table 1’s left and right columns indicate whether Ani’s ownership of
Parcel X is socially beneficial or socially costly.158 Because the table
focuses on conditions that might cause the government to change the
assignment of ownership, the left column involves the situation in which
Ani does not (yet) own Parcel X, but it would be socially beneficial for
her to do so. Conversely, the right column involves Ani’s socially costly
current ownership of Parcel X. In assessing social benefits and costs,
much turns on the word “ownership.” If we assume that the government
has free rein to make and collect transfer payments to address distributive or other justice concerns, the only reason to employ coercion to
change Parcel X ’s ownership would be if ownership itself in a given pair of
hands (here, Ani’s) conferred social benefits or imposed social costs
above and beyond what could be conveyed or collected through a
transfer payment of equal expected value.159
The most familiar manifestation of government coercion is found in
Cell III: takings and other coercive dispossessions.160 Takings become
plausible when, in our example, Ani’s ownership of Parcel X has become
socially costly (perhaps because Parcel X lies in the path of a proposed
highway or rail line),161 yet Ani finds continued ownership of the parcel
privately beneficial. If the first condition were not met, the ownership
change produced by the taking would lack normative justification, and if
156. I set aside the possibility that people want property that will harm their own
subjectively perceived interests or want to be rid of property that will further their own
subjectively perceived interests.
157. See supra Part I.B (outlining reasons why ownership might be aversive).
158. Socially beneficial or costly here means beneficial or costly on net to the society
as a whole. Because the society includes Ani, placement in the socially costly column
means that the total social costs of her ownership outweigh the benefits, if any, to Ani;
likewise, placement in the socially beneficial column means that the benefits to society of
Ani’s ownership outweigh the costs, if any, to Ani.
159. The ability of the government to make and collect transfer payments also carries
implications for the stability of the rows, as discussed below. See infra Part IV.B.1.
160. “Takings,” unlike the other terms used in Table 1, is a doctrinal term of art that
builds in a payment obligation. Because some government actions that dispossess owners
coercively do not require compensation (consider, for example, civil forfeitures), the cell’s
description must be broadened beyond those actions that would count as takings. For ease
of exposition, the balance of the discussion uses the unadorned term “takings” to refer to
all coercive dispossessions, except where it becomes necessary to draw a distinction
between compensated and uncompensated dispossessions.
161. Ownership might be socially costly not only because it blocks ownership by a
higher-valuing user (as in the textual example) but also because of direct effects, such as
nuisance or blight.
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the second condition were not met, the transfer would not be coercive.
Of course, even if both conditions are met, a taking is not the only
option; a private negotiated sale might be pursued instead if holdout
problems were not anticipated. The point here is simply to specify the
minimum conditions that might make a taking plausible.
Consider next Cell I, in which Ani does not yet own Parcel X, but
her ownership would be both beneficial to society at large and privately
beneficial to her. If market failures preclude Ani from acquiring Parcel X
through normal channels, the government might confer ownership on
Ani in these circumstances—a giving.162 Thus, for example, property condemned through eminent domain may be reconveyed to a private
party.163 Notably, givings are not coercive insofar as the ownership interests they confer are either actively pursued—as is typically the case in the
eminent domain context—or passively welcomed.164 The collection of an
associated payment for a giving may be coercive, however—a point that
will be taken up below.165
The bottom row of Table 1 contains governmental ownership
changes involving privately burdensome ownership. In Cell II, Ani does
not own Parcel X and does not want to own it, but her ownership of the
parcel would be socially beneficial. This convergence of privately burdensome but socially beneficial ownership describes circumstances in which
forcings could become plausible.166 To be sure, one might question
whether there is much meaningful content in Cell II, or whether such
privately costly new ownership is nearly always also socially costly; the
point here is simply to specify the minimum conditions that would be
necessary (but not sufficient) to justify a forcing.

162. Because the focus here is on possessory ownership interests, my use of the term
“giving” corresponds to Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky’s category of “physical
givings.” See Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 10, at 564, 567–69. Other
governmental actions confer nonpossessory benefits on landowners, as where a new road
or development facilitated by eminent domain provides positive externalities for nearby
owners who were not displaced. See, e.g., id. at 551 (defining “derivative givings” as those
in which “the state indirectly increases the value of property by engaging in a physical or
regulatory giving or taking”).
163. For instance, in the infamous Poletown case, the Michigan Supreme Court
upheld the use of eminent domain to displace a close-knit neighborhood to provide an
assembly plant site to General Motors. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,
304 N.W.2d 455, 459–60 (Mich. 1981), overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
164. For example, one of the Poletown dissents stressed General Motors’ involvement
in soliciting Detroit’s use of eminent domain to site its assembly plant. See id. at 466–70
(Ryan, J. dissenting).
165. See infra text accompanying notes 184–192.
166. Cell II focuses on instances in which a current nonowner would be compelled to
become an owner. There is a shadow form of forcings—forced retention by a current
owner—that will be incorporated into the analysis below. Infra note 170 and
accompanying text.
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Recognizing forcings suggests a fourth category shown in Cell IV,
“relievings.” Here, Ani owns Parcel X but does not want to own it anymore, and society does not want her to own it either. The fact that she
continues to own the parcel under these circumstances suggests some
legal or practical impediment has prevented markets from shifting ownership out of her hands. Thus, Ani’s ownership of Parcel X is costly to
herself and to society in a way that markets cannot address. Relievings
would respond to this combination by lifting ownership and its associated
burdens from an owner in Ani’s position, at her request.
Each cell in Table 1 contains a misalignment between the socially
optimal assignment of ownership and the ownership that actually exists.
In Cells II and III, existing ownership aligns with private payoffs but misaligns with social payoffs. Government-imposed ownership changes to
address these mismatches between private and social payoffs would operate coercively against an owner like Ani, whether by taking property away
from her (Cell III) or forcing it on her (Cell II). By contrast, Cells I and
IV present situations in which the existing ownership assignment fails to
align with both social and private payoffs. Here, governmental action to
realign ownership for the social good would also be privately beneficial
to an owner like Ani, whether by giving her property that she wants or
relieving her of property she does not want. Of course, carrying out such
an action in favor of Ani may require coercion of some other owner or
owners. Thus, a giving to one owner may be preceded by a taking from
another,167 and a relieving of one owner may be followed by a forcing of
another.
B. Ownership Alignments and Misalignments
Table 1 focused exclusively on instances in which existing ownership
diverged from the social ideal in ways that markets could not fix—conditions that presented the possibility of governmental action to reassign
ownership. But where markets work well to produce socially valuable
ownership and nonownership arrangements, the government has no
interest in intervening. Table 2 adds two new columns to capture these
(presumably ubiquitous) states of the world: one in which current ownership is socially beneficial and should not be altered, and a second in
which a change in ownership would be socially costly and should not be
brought about.

167. See Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 10, at 564–74 & tbls.1–2
(examining ways in which takings and givings may be combined).
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TABLE 2: ALIGNED AND MISALIGNED OWNERSHIP
New
Ownership
by A Is
Socially
Beneficial

Current
Ownership
by A Is
Socially
Costly

Current
Ownership
by A Is
Socially
Beneficial

New
Ownership
by A Is
Socially
Costly

A’s
Ownership
Is Privately
Beneficial

I.
GIVINGS

III.
TAKINGS

V.
ORDINARY
OWNERSHIP

VII.
BLOCKED
ACQUISITION

A’s
Ownership
Is Privately
Costly

II.
FORCINGS

IV.
RELIEVINGS

VI.
FORCED
RETENTION

VIII.
ORDINARY
NONOWNERSHIP

When these columns are added, two new misalignment possibilities
emerge in which the government might play a role—this time to maintain
existing ownership arrangements rather than to change them. The first is
found in Cell VII, where ownership is desired by a would-be new owner,
A, but is socially costly. Blocked acquisition is a potential response. For
example, some property might be held entirely out of private hands in
order to achieve social objectives, like preserving public access to navigable waterways.168 In other cases, the law may apply more fine-grained
eligibility criteria to screen out specific would-be owners whose ownership is predicted to be socially costly. For instance, laws prescribe eligibility requirements to acquire items such as alcohol, drugs, and firearms.169 It is of course open to question whether any given limit on
acquisition targets ownership that would actually be socially harmful; the
point is only that blocked acquisition represents a possible response
where ownership would be (in fact) socially harmful despite being privately valuable.
An additional misalignment emerges in Cell VI, where current
owner A finds ownership privately costly, though it remains socially beneficial. Here, a potential governmental response is forced retention.170
168. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American
Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 799,
801–03 (2004) (discussing inalienability rule articulated in Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)).
169. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 970,
974–78 (1985) (discussing limits on sale of guns, alcohol, and drugs, including age
requirements and other eligibility criteria).
170. Cell VI’s forced-retention category represents a shadow form of the forcings
(more precisely, forced acquisitions) represented in Cell II. Forced retentions are more
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Alienability restrictions and bans on abandonment of real property offer
real-world examples.171 There is again an empirical question about
whether the compelled prolongation of ownership produces social benefits in real situations, such that it is properly situated in Cell VI, or
whether forced retention instead usually produces the sorts of social
costs that might locate the situation in Cell IV, the proper domain of
relievings. The goal here is simply to specify minimum conditions for the
governmental response of forced retention, not to describe existing or
proposed instances of forced retention.
Table 2’s expanded matrix also includes two cases of complete
alignment between private and social payoffs and ownership assignment.
The first, found in Cell V, is ordinary ownership; here, current owner A
finds ownership beneficial, and so does society. Cell VIII contains the
opposite (but equally congenial) situation in which nonowner A views
ownership of a particular property as costly, and society concurs. These
two cells presumably contain the overwhelming majority of property
arrangements in a well-functioning market economy. In such a system,
the private and social payoffs to ownership are not independent of each
other, aligning only by chance. Rather, the fact that a person values ownership enough to win it under such a system makes out a pretty good
(although not airtight) case that her ownership will also be socially beneficial.172 Similarly, the fact that one does not value ownership enough to
win it under these same market conditions suggests that one’s ownership
is likely to impose social costs—at the very least, the opportunity cost
associated with keeping the property out of the hands of a higher valuer.
Thus, in the ordinary case of ownership, the social benefits largely flow
from the very fact that the ownership is deemed privately beneficial; conversely, in the ordinary case of nonownership, the social costs of imposing ownership largely stem from its unwanted nature.
Why, then, would misalignments ever arise between the private and
social costs or benefits of ownership? To ask the question is to suggest its
answer: externalities. Underpinning the presumed correlation between
private and social returns to ownership is an implicit assumption that the
market system works with reasonable efficiency in assigning ownership to
high valuers. Externalities undermine that assumption. Where ownership
offers opportunities to offload costs on others—whether by engaging in
land uses that have negative spillovers or strategically using one’s ownership interest to hold out for more surplus—it may be privately beneficial

heterogeneous than forced acquisitions because private and public acts and omissions can
combine in innumerable ways to make it difficult as a practical or legal matter to
terminate ownership.
171. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing unwanted retention).
172. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 19 (manuscript at 10) (“Usually, current property
owners are the ones who value their things the most, as they have already out-bid others in
a market economy and acquired title.”).
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without being socially beneficial.173 Likewise, ownership that is socially
valuable may remain privately costly if the social benefits produced by
ownership take the form of positive externalities that the owner cannot
capture.174
It is the presence of externalities, then, that pushes real-world situations into the misaligned cells of Table 2, producing conditions in which
governmental action to change or maintain ownership could become
plausible. But the government actions outlined in Table 2 are not the
only possible responses to misalignments in ownership. There are good
normative arguments against employing forcings when less coercive
alternatives exist, just as there are good normative arguments against
resorting to takings when less coercive alternatives would do the job.175
To define the space in which forcings might become normatively viable,
then, it is first necessary to consider other measures that would help to
move real-world situations out of the problematically misaligned cells
and into the agreeable domains of ordinary ownership and ordinary
nonownership.
The next Part will examine these alternatives in detail, but a few initial observations will help to set the stage. First, the question of whether
ownership is socially beneficial or costly in the hands of a particular person must be kept separate from the question of whether that person
deserves to bear a financial burden or enjoy a financial benefit. Because
the government can impose payment obligations or bestow benefits
without altering or influencing ownership at all, coercive actions to start,
end, or protract ownership must be justified on other grounds—grounds
that relate to the benefits or costs uniquely delivered by ownership itself.
Conversely, the fact that someone does not deserve to bear a burden or
receive a benefit should not necessarily rule out any of the governmental
actions in Table 2, if the action is otherwise justified by its social benefits.
This is because any of these governmental interventions into ownership
arrangements can be accompanied by compensation flowing to or from
the affected party.176

173. In the case of negative spillovers, the reason for the mismatch between private
and social payoffs is obvious: Owners are not internalizing all of the costs of an activity that
produces private benefits for them. Where holdout problems are involved, it is the owner’s
bargaining behavior regarding the property (rather than her activities on the property)
that produces externalities. See Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 907, 928–29 (2004) (explaining that holdout behavior generates heightened
bargaining costs and opportunity costs associated with thwarted deals, both of which
partially fall on parties other than the holdout).
174. See, e.g., id. at 915–16 (discussing potential incentive misalignments produced
by positive externalities).
175. Similar points might be made about forced retention and blocked acquisition.
176. To be sure, there are important questions about the adequacy and
appropriateness of such compensation in particular instances. See infra Part V.B.2–3
(addressing these points).
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Second, the discussion to this point has treated the private assessment of ownership’s costs or benefits—the question of whether a situation falls in the top or bottom row of Tables 1 and 2—as a stable fact. But
there are many things that the law can do to influence the attractiveness
of ownership relative to nonownership—including (but not limited to)
taxing it or subsidizing it.177 Thus, ownership that produces social benefits may be encouraged rather than forced, and ownership that produces
social harms may be discouraged rather than blocked or terminated.
Such moves could change unwanted property to wanted (and vice versa),
generating shifts between the rows in the tables above that would align
private and social payoffs.
Third, whether ownership in a given set of hands produces costs or
benefits to society may turn on any number of other policy choices surrounding ownership, including how land is regulated and how other
nonpossessory interests—easements, covenants, and the like—are treated. By adjusting these elements, law can often change the column that a
given situation resides within, turning socially costly ownership into
socially beneficial ownership (by, for example, requiring a factory to
control its emissions), or turning socially costly nonownership into
socially beneficial nonownership (as by making the nonowner responsible for certain impacts through bonding mechanisms).178
Revisiting Table 2 with these observations in mind reveals three
points relevant to forced ownership. First, many situations that might
initially appear to reside in Cells II or VI—where ownership is privately
aversive but socially desirable—may not really fit in those boxes at all if
ownership itself, as opposed to the imposition of a particular payment
obligation, adds no social value. Second, the law has at its disposal many
means to move situations out of those cells, short of forcing ownership—
whether by altering the private payoffs to ownership or refining ownership in ways that change its social payoffs. Third, some of these legal
mechanisms, such as taxes and subsidies, may help to reveal which cell a
particular situation actually resides within by eliciting information about
how much a particular party desires ownership or nonownership. If society properly sets the price for entering into or ending ownership, A’s
choice to pay and proceed demonstrates an alignment between her preferred ownership arrangement and the social optimum.179
177. See infra Part IV.B (discussing repricing alternatives).
178. See infra Part IV.C (discussing stakes and bonds).
179. This amounts to a liability rule solution with respect to the ownership
entitlement. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 6, at 1092 (distinguishing property
rules from liability rules). Often, liability rules are used where the private benefits are
unknown, as a way to elicit them and gauge whether they exceed the social costs. See, e.g.,
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 725–26 (1996) (noting information-forcing properties of
liability rules).
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IV. ALTERNATIVES TO FORCINGS
The ability of the government to collect and disburse funds, to tax
and subsidize, and to otherwise alter the attractiveness of ownership
raises doubts about the utility of forcings. Why would forced ownership
ever dominate strategies like repricing ownership or simply collecting
money from parties who have imposed negative externalities or enjoyed
positive ones? This Part considers the scope and limits of these and other
alternatives that fall short of compelling full-strength possessory ownership. Examining the efficacy and limits of these other approaches defines
the space within which a forcings doctrine could add value.
As section A explains, society’s goals often do not require ownership
at all, but rather can be fully served by a collection mechanism that
imposes normatively justified burdens. Section B examines pricing
mechanisms, including auctions, that can bring about socially beneficial
ownership without coercively imposing it on an unwilling owner. Section
C considers alternatives that compel something short of full possessory
ownership, such as mandating that individuals take stakes in a particular
property or enterprise, or requiring them to accept downside risk
through a bonding mechanism.
Two points are worth emphasizing at the outset. First, while these
alternatives may seem less normatively objectionable than imposing fullstrength possessory ownership outright, they are not necessarily immune
to legal challenges based on interferences with property, autonomy, due
process, or other interests. Second, because parties might at times prefer
the imposition of full ownership over some of these alternatives, the fact
that one of these alternatives fits the bill does not automatically rule out
including involuntary ownership on a slate of choices extended to a party
who will be subject to governmental action.
A. Collections Distinguished
The fact that it is normatively appropriate to impose a burden on a
particular party does not establish, on its own, that the burden should
take the form of an unwanted ownership interest. Externalities can often
be addressed through systems of payments and collections. Mundane
examples include the imposition of taxes, fees, and damages of various
sorts when a party’s actions cause impacts that her own property ownership interests do not automatically charge against her account. While
collections are likely to be both aversive to the owner and coercively
imposed by the government, they do not force the transfer of possessory
ownership. Collections that accompany the consensual transfer of possessory property interests can also be distinguished from forcings. Thus, it is
not a forcing when a voluntary purchase transaction is followed by a
coercive action to collect payment for it, assuming the amount collected
represents the agreed-upon purchase price.
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Consider next remedial situations where a party is forced to purchase, say, the encroached-upon land of another. In this setting, the collection of payment is the aversive aspect of the forced transaction; the
property itself has positive value (though by hypothesis, not as much
positive value as the forced-purchase price). This situation counts as a
forcing within the meaning of this Article even though the transfer of the
possessory property interest mitigates rather than exacerbates the loss
occasioned by the collection of the purchase price. Because the collection in such a case is part of an unwanted purchase transaction and finds
its justification in the unsought transfer itself, it represents more than
just a collection of funds. Moreover, the party’s ongoing interaction with
the transferred property will determine how much she gains or loses
from the forced purchase, making it truly a case of imposed ownership,
not just a forced collection.
A look at governmental givings helps to further illuminate the distinction between collecting funds and imposing ownership. Governmental actions can bestow benefits as well as impose burdens.180 These
benefits can take the form of physical grants of property to a party, or
can instead flow from regulatory changes to a landowner’s parcel or from
governmental actions on nearby parcels that produce positive
externalities for a given landowner.181 Much of the givings literature
focuses on the challenge of recapturing the windfalls that arise through
these sorts of governmental actions.182 Central questions involve when
and how charges can be imposed for benefits conferred.183
Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have focused on a number
of features that they find relevant to the question of charging for benefits.184 One of these features is what they term “refusability.”185 They note
that a benefit that is forced on a recipient amounts to the exercise of a

180. Indeed, unless governmental actions are imposed for no reason, they are
necessarily accompanied by benefits that go to other parties. Takings thus imply givings.
See Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 10, at 550 (“Like a reflection in a mirror,
the massive universe of takings is everywhere accompanied by givings.”).
181. See id. at 551 (defining physical, regulatory, and derivative givings).
182. See, e.g., Windfalls for Wipeouts, supra note 10, at 15–27, 311–552 (discussing
techniques for recapturing windfalls conferred on landowners and for using proceeds to
compensate landowners who lose property value); Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra
note 10, at 577–618 (exploring why and how to apply charges to givings).
183. See, e.g., Rachelle Alterman, Land Use Regulations and Property Values: The
“Windfalls Recapture” Idea, in The Oxford Handbook on Urban Economics and Planning
755, 766–75 (Nancy Brooks et al. eds., 2012) (providing multicountry examination of
“betterment capture” levies and discussing some impediments to their implementation);
Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 10, at 590–604 (distinguishing chargeable from
nonchargeable givings).
184. Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 10, at 590–605.
185. Id. at 601–04.
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put option—i.e., a forcing.186 Noting the interference with autonomy that
might be produced by the exercise of such options by the government,187
they suggest that charges only apply after the individual has accepted the
benefit, or after she has realized a gain associated with it (as upon sale of
a benefited property).188 Their first alternative, actual acceptance, fits
well with the term “giving” insofar as it requires the recipient’s consent
(though perhaps it is better understood as “selling” since payment is
demanded in exchange).
Bell and Parchomovsky’s second alternative, the coerced collection
of a realized gain,189 sounds more like forced ownership. Yet in an
important sense, it is not. As suggested above, the ownership strategy is
crucially about responsibility for outcomes rather than expected values,
and hence involves bearing risk.190 If the government-installed improvement down the street from a given home is expected to generate
$100,000 in added value for that home, then truly forcing a sale of that
benefit stream would mean collecting now and letting the homeowner
bear the risk that the actual value added will be higher or lower. Under
Bell and Parchomovsky’s approach,191 this risk is not borne by the homeowner. Instead, she only disgorges the benefits that she actually realizes
upon sale.192 This has a financial impact on her, to be sure, but it does
not require her to bear the risk of owning the outcomes. Nor does she
hold any possessory interest in the government-installed property that
would enable her to manage such outcomes. Thus, while collections of
this sort edge very close to forcings, they remain distinguishable.
B. Repricing (and Its Limits)
Ownership in a particular party’s hands may dominate a system of
transfer payments if that party is better positioned to bear or influence
the variance associated with potential outcomes.193 This does not establish that ownership should be forced, however—it might instead be
repriced. This is a different point than the one made in the previous section. The previous discussion established that monetary payments to or
from the government can often be used to address externalities directly,
without reassigning ownership. This would be the preferred path if own186. See id. at 602 (“The giving power, in this framework, is equivalent to a put
option.”).
187. See id. (“The reason to be even more cautious about givings than about takings
is grounded in notions of autonomy.”).
188. Id. at 603–04.
189. Id. at 608.
190. See supra Part II.A.
191. Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 10, at 603–04.
192. See id. at 603 (“Our rule dictates that the charge for this nonrefusable benefit
be deferred until its value is actually realized—for example, by sale of the property.”).
193. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text (discussing link between
ownership and risk bearing).
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ership itself did not uniquely confer benefits. The discussion here
assumes that ownership does uniquely confer benefits; the question is
whether there are better ways to bring about changes in ownership without directly imposing those changes by fiat. The two points are linked,
however, because governmental actions that internalize externalities may
cause parties to change their minds about the value of ownership or
nonownership. The difference goes to whether the focus is on using a
technology other than ownership to address external impacts or on using
a repricing mechanism rather than outright coercion to directly induce
desired ownership patterns.
Repricing of ownership can be accomplished either through a system of financial inducements (taxes, penalties, subsidies, or other
payments) or by altering in-kind aspects of the ownership package. The
sections below consider these possibilities in turn.
1. Paying for Ownership Choices. — Monetary inducements or penalties can change unwanted ownership into wanted ownership, and vice
versa, generating movement between the rows in Tables 1 and 2 above.
This effect is easy to see where current ownership arrangements are beneficial to the owner but costly to society—a set of conditions where a taking might be contemplated. It is often possible to induce the owner to
relinquish ownership voluntarily by offering a high enough price for the
property; property that was initially privately beneficial becomes privately
costly given the newly increased opportunity cost of holding onto it
rather than selling. Or suppose a nonowner would find ownership privately beneficial, but that new ownership relationship will impose social
costs. Rather than simply block acquisition, the government might attach
Pigouvian taxes to the acquisition that would take account of the burdens
it would impose.194 If the tax is set correctly, it would change an ownership relationship that is only desired because of the cost-offloading
opportunities it provides into an appropriately priced, and hence
unwanted, ownership relationship.
Just as taxes or offers to purchase at an above-market price can turn
wanted ownership into unwanted ownership, subsidies or offers to sell at
a below-market price can transform property that would otherwise be
unwanted by a nonowner into property that is wanted by its (new)
owner—that is, a routine case of ordinary (albeit subsidized) ownership.195 Government subsidies for homeownership are a familiar, if

194. See A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, pt. 2, ch. 9, §§ 13–17, at 192–203
(4th ed. 1932) (advocating taxes or subsidies to address divergence between private and
social payoffs); see also Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental
Economics: A Survey, 30 J. Econ. Lit. 675, 680 (1992) (describing Pigouvian taxes, which
charge actors based on marginal cost of external harm inflicted).
195. See, e.g., Cropper & Oates, supra note 194, at 681–82 (discussing subsidies as
alternative way to address external effects and noting some asymmetries in their operation
relative to taxes).
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controversial and empirically suspect, example.196 Land transfers to private parties following the exercise of eminent domain also typically
embed a valuable subsidy: The government supplies an assemblage of
land that the private party could not aggregate as cheaply on her own,
charges a below-market price for the property conveyed, or both.197 Local
governments also use a variety of other forms of subsidies and tax breaks
to influence parties’ development choices.198
The government may also offer low or even negative sales prices for
real estate to induce purchase where demand is lacking. For example,
Gary, Indiana, recently began selling vacant homes for just $1 to qualifying buyers,199 and Detroit’s former mayor introduced initiatives to provide forgivable loans and renovation funds to owners willing to buy
vacant houses.200 Financial inducements to continue ownership may also
be used. For example, loan modification efforts spearheaded by the government effectively subsidize continued homeownership by borrowers
who are unable to cover existing payments.
The fact that society can choose between taxes and subsidies (or
combinations thereof) offers a great deal of flexibility to tailor solutions
to fit distributive criteria. For example, instead of subsidizing continued
ownership, the government could impose charges on parties who wish to
end ownership where doing so will inflict costs on society.201 As a practi196. See, e.g., Satyajit Chatterjee, Taxes, Homeownership, and the Allocation of
Residential Real Estate Risks, Bus. Rev. (Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Pa.), Sept.–
Oct. 1996, at 3, 4–6, available at http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/publications/
business-review/1996/september-october/brso96sc.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (detailing tax advantages of homeownership); see also, e.g., William G. Gale et al.,
Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 Tax Notes 1171, 1171 (2007),
available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/1001084_encouraging_homeownership.
pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating available evidence suggests mortgageinterest deduction “does little if anything to encourage homeownership” but rather
“serves mainly to raise the price of housing and land and to encourage people who do buy
homes to borrow more and to buy larger homes than they otherwise would”).
197. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Reframing Eminent Domain: Unsupported Advocacy,
Ambiguous Economics, and the Case for a New Public Use Test, 32 Vt. L. Rev. 129, 151
(2007) (“Eminent domain, the threat of it and the actuality of it, lowers the land-assembly
costs developers otherwise would face, and in that sense the threat of eminent domain can
be conceived of as a kind of subsidy to developers.”); Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use”
Requirement in Eminent Domain: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private
Influence, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 37–39 (2006) (giving examples of nominally priced or
heavily discounted transfers to private parties following use of eminent domain).
198. E.g., Dana, supra note 197, at 151–52.
199. Steven Yaccino, A Chance to Own a Home for $1 in a City on the Ropes, N.Y.
Times (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/us/a-chance-to-own-ahome-for-1-in-a-city-on-the-ropes.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
200. Kamelia Angelova, Detroit Will PAY You to Take One of These 100 Abandoned
Homes, Bus. Insider (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/abandoned-housesdetroit-2011-2 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
201. Combinations of taxes and subsidies could also be used where distributive
considerations argue against using one or the other alone. For example, land that a party
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cal matter, however, not all alternatives will be available in all cases.
Judgment-proof parties will be unable to pay charges that are levied on
them,202 while governmental bodies may be unwilling or unable to pay
reluctant parties to begin or continue socially valuable ownership.
Another complication is that the amount of benefit or harm that
ownership does in a given instance may depend on the specific owner
and how her ownership fits into larger ownership patterns, making pricing challenging. For example, studies show that clusters of foreclosures
within close proximity of each other produce effects on nearby property
values.203 Consequently, the social benefits of addressing foreclosure
spillovers through changes in ownership patterns might grow nonlinearly
as the number of such foreclosures increases. Similarly, inducing ownership here may be more valuable than inducing ownership there, if a particular spatial pattern of ownership or nonownership is especially
important to achieve or avoid.
Of course, it is not necessary that a repricing strategy be pursued
across the board for a particular type of ownership; more tailored possibilities exist. For example, if it is essential that particular parcels pass into
private ownership (or into new private ownership) without fail, then
some kind of auction mechanism might be used for those parcels. The
fact that a given parcel might have negative expected value presents no
impediment; auctions can easily be used to allocate bads as well as goods.
This point is readily illustrated by airline oversales procedures, which typically employ an informal auction mechanism to get sufficient passengers
to accept the bad—a bump to a later flight.204
Repricing can also be tailored to attract a particular subset of potential owners. Thus, a subsidy program might be limited to people who are
especially well positioned to take on a certain ownership obligation.205 An
already owns might be taxed more heavily if she fails to also acquire an adjacent parcel
that is positioned in a manner that is difficult for any other owner to access, while the
purchase of that adjacent parcel might also be subsidized. Together, the tax on
nonacquisition and the subsidy for acquisition would total the social benefit associated
with ownership, but the government would not have to cover the entire amount in the
form of a subsidy.
202. Collecting a refundable payment in advance through a bonding mechanism
offers one solution to this problem. See infra Part IV.C (discussing bonds as alternative to
ownership).
203. See, e.g., Jenny Schuetz, Vicki Been & Ingrid Gould Ellen, Neighborhood
Effects of Concentrated Mortgage Foreclosures, 17 J. Housing Econ. 306, 317 (2008)
(finding close proximity to clusters of foreclosures, beyond certain minimum threshold,
depresses sales prices).
204. See Inhaber, NIMBY, supra note 123, at 44–45 (classifying this approach as
reverse Dutch auction, with increasingly larger amounts offered until enough takers are
found).
205. In some cases, minimum financial requirements might be applied in an effort to
ensure that the new owners will be able to adequately discharge their obligations. Yaccino,
supra note 199 (reporting on Gary, Indiana’s program for $1 home purchases, which
requires buyers to “meet a minimum income threshold (starting at $35,250 for one
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example of such selective repricing is found in “blotting” programs that
allow homeowners to cheaply purchase city-owned vacant lots that adjoin
their own residential parcels.206 The program can be understood as an
attempt to capitalize on complementarities that exist between an owner’s
current holdings and adjacent ones. The obligations of ownership over
the vacant lot are likely to be self-enforcing; the owner lives next door
and will personally suffer spillovers from any neglect. As a result, society
can glean greater net benefits from the ownership arrangement.
The situations in which repricing is least likely to offer a complete
solution mirror the situations that justify eminent domain: ones in which
several complementary changes in ownership are necessary, and failure
to achieve the full set torpedoes the chance for nearly all of the available
social gains. In the takings context, offering a payment to a landowner
whose privately beneficial ownership of a chunk of land stands in the way
of a valuable highway assembly will not always be enough; holdout problems can interfere with the ordinary processes of buying and selling. Similarly, a nonowner’s veto power might stand in the way of a desired
pattern of ownership where that nonowner is especially well suited (given
her other property holdings) to take on ownership of the parcel in question. But very often, desired ownership choices can be elicited through
pricing, rather than by fiat.
2. Adjusting the Ownership Bargain. — There are many things that
society can do to alter the relative attractiveness of ownership and
nonownership beyond attaching taxes or subsidies to these choices.
Innumerable regulatory policies, from zoning to mortgage regulation,
impact private ownership choices. More foundationally, the way in which
the ownership package itself is legally and socially constructed will
influence whether individuals view it as worth taking on.207 Of particular
person) and . . . demonstrate the financial ability to bring the neglected property up to
code within six months”). The Gary program also contains a feature in common with
earlier homesteading enactments: Owners must live in the property for five years before
they receive full ownership rights. Id.; see supra note 127 (discussing requirements of
Homestead Act and rationales for them).
206. The term “blotting” comes from the contraction of “block lot.” See David
Lepeska, Is Blotting the Best Solution for Shrinking Cities?, CityLab (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.citylab.com/housing/2011/11/blotting-good-or-bad-shrinking-cities/470/
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing blotting programs in several cities and
attributing term to the Brooklyn planning and design firm Interboro); see also Kate
Davidson, Blotting Update: Detroit Wants to Sell You This Lot for $200, Mich. Pub. Radio
(Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.michiganradio.org/post/blotting-update-detroit-wants-sellyou-lot-200 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on Detroit’s blotting
program); Adjacent Neighbors Land Acquisition Program (ANLAP), City of Chi., http://
www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/dcd/supp_info/adjacent_neighborslandacquisition
programanlap.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited September 9, 2014)
(describing Chicago’s program).
207. The discussion here sets aside for the moment one aspect of property bundling
that lies at the heart of this Article’s analysis: the degree to which future ownership
obligations (such as caring for the offspring of one’s cow) are involuntarily bundled with
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interest for this discussion are the ways in which adjusting the overall
ownership package could differentially attract or repel owners whose
ownership would be more or less likely to add social value.
Suppose, for example, that widespread, small-scale property ownership by individuals and households produces social value that exceeds
that which can be produced through large, consolidated blocks of ownership.208 If such small-scale owners are in a poor position to bear risk,
then adjusting the risk that owners must bear, whether through changes
in tenure forms or other policy initiatives, could encourage their participation in ownership. Where the relevant risks are amenable to the
owner’s control, in whole or in part, responsibility for outcomes can help
to align incentives—a social benefit. But exposure to risks that an owner
has little ability to control, such as those produced by local land use
choices or changes in the local housing market, does not serve this function.209 Unless the exposure in question is doing something else, such as
adding diversification or hedging against specific other risks that the
owner faces,210 it represents a gamble that the owner may not desire and
may be in a poor position to bear. Improving the capacity to slice off and
neutralize uncontrollable risks is one way to make the overall ownership
bargain more attractive to risk-averse owners.211
Other aspects of the ownership bundle influence the attractiveness
of private property ownership as well. The law must make tradeoffs
between the freedom afforded individual owners to engage in uses of
their own choosing and the goals of the community (including protecting landowners from the uses of others). The way in which this
balance is struck will carry different consequences for different potential
owners. Likewise, the ease or difficulty with which ownership can be

earlier, voluntarily acquired property interests (such as the original cow). This issue will be
taken up below. See infra Part V.B.2. Although these bundlings can indeed make
voluntary ownership more or less attractive, they arguably represent examples of forcings
rather than alternatives to them.
208. See infra note 266 and accompanying text (discussing costs of consolidated
ownership).
209. See, e.g., Fennell, Homeownership, supra note 111, at 1061–62 (distinguishing
home-equity risks that lie under homeowner’s control from those that do not).
210. See, e.g., id. at 1053–54 (noting home-equity risk might be used to hedge risk
associated with future home purchase in same market or correlated market); Lu Han, The
Effects of Price Risk on Housing Demand: Empirical Evidence from U.S. Markets, 23 Rev.
Fin. Stud. 3889, 3890 (2010) (“[I]f the price of a future house is positively correlated with
the price of the current house, the household may make an earlier or larger home
purchase in order to offset future housing cost risk . . . .”).
211. If, conversely, one believed that large-scale ownership tended to produce more
social value than small-scale ownership, and if large-scale owners were better positioned to
bear risk, then bundling substantial risk-bearing with ownership would tend to select for
large-scale owners.
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overridden through eminent domain will influence its value for
prospective owners.212
To be sure, ownership’s attractions, at least for individual households, often run deeper than the allocation of risks and benefits. Ownership may simply push the right psychological buttons. Yet the way the
ownership relationship is understood and valued depends on the way in
which it is framed.213 There are cultural factors at work as well, along with
advantages that may be largely contingent on particular legal and social
features.214 For example, homeowners in the United States tend to enjoy
much greater security of tenure than renters—but this is not
inevitable.215 Thus, the relationship between private and social benefits is
mutable, and different motivations for ownership may also resonate with
different sorts of would-be owners. Recalibrating the ownership package
thus offers an additional way to address or arrest misalignments between
private and social payoffs to ownership. But, like other forms of
repricing, it cannot always address instances where ownership by specific
parties would be uniquely valuable.
C. Bonds and Stakes
Ownership’s distinctive social value comes from its capacity to place
actual outcomes on owners. Full possessory ownership does this in a particular way, by automatically imposing those costs or conferring those
212. Although fear that eminent domain will displace owners with high subjective
value is frequently the focus of analysis, the way in which a society uses condemnation
could also influence the calculations of risk-seeking or optimistic owners who hope their
parcels will one day become integral to a large and valuable development assembly. The
well-known potential of holdouts to thwart or raise the costs of land assemblies makes it
highly speculative to what extent any such owner could reasonably expect to reap an
unusually large surplus. Nonetheless, the chance at such a bounty is doubtless attractive to
some potential owners. This motive for ownership is diminished if eminent domain stands
ready to step in. The normative valence of holding out for more than one’s true
reservation price in an effort to glean surplus from another party is a subject of much
debate. Compare Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of
Property Right, 122 Yale L.J. 1444, 1468 (2013) (characterizing party who stood on his
exclusion rights as “hold[ing] the developer up for ransom”), with James E. Krier &
Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440, 465–67 (1995) (critiquing characterization of holdouts as
extortionists).
213. Recent empirical work has explored how people perceive ownership and the
extent to which those perceptions are malleable. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash &
Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 449, 456 (2010) (finding, in
study involving first-year law students, that altering framing of hypothetical property rights
in laptops “changes expectations regarding the strength of property rights and reactions
to subsequent regulation”).
214. See, e.g., Fennell, Homeownership, supra note 111, at 1058–59 (discussing
cultural primacy of homeownership).
215. See, e.g., id. at 1054–57 (noting sources of tenure insecurity for tenants and
possibility these factors could be addressed by longer-term or otherwise more tenantprotective leases).
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benefits that (literally) come with the territory. It is an especially suitable
strategy where it is easier to define and contain the set of relevant outcomes by placing physical borders around a resource than it is to enumerate and separately contract over the relevant inputs or outcomes.216
But physical boundaries can be both overinclusive and underinclusive in
channeling relevant outcomes to the accounts of owners. For this reason,
physical possession and exclusion rights are not sufficient to fully align
incentives. And, importantly for the present discussion, physical possession is not always necessary to address incentive problems either.
One facet of this point was made above in observing that taxes, fees,
and damages can be used to align incentives.217 However, these monetary
impositions are often based on expected rather than actual outcomes,
for reasons that relate to administrability. Yet sometimes it is possible to
isolate and track actual outcomes as they unfold over time, and to charge
those actual outcomes to a party without making that party a possessory
owner. Thus, various forms of bonding and stakeholding can often
achieve the beneficial effects of compulsory ownership without actually
compelling full possessory ownership.
Consider laws that mandate the advance posting of bonds. The basic
idea can be illustrated by bottle deposits: The upfront payment for the
bottle is designed to cover the social costs of its improper disposal, but
that payment can be recovered if the bottle is returned.218 The risk of an
improper disposal is thereby shifted to the bottle’s owner, who holds a
put option to sell the bottle back in recyclable condition.219 While the
bottle deposit operates in a binary way—if you return the bottle, you get
the full deposit back—bonding mechanisms could instead look to
observable indicia of actual outcomes (water quality or air quality, for
example) to determine how much of a given bond will be returned.220
216. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text (discussing Smith’s formulation
of property’s “exclusion strategy”).
217. See supra Part IV.B.1.
218. The bottle deposit is an intuitive example, but the approach has been
generalized. E.g., Peter Bohm, Deposit-Refund Systems: Theory and Applications to
Environmental, Conservation, and Consumer Policy (1981); Don Fullerton & Ann
Wolverton, Two Generalizations of a Deposit-Refund System (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7505, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w7505.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Edwin Mills and Robert Solow are
credited with laying the intellectual foundations for this approach. See Edwin S. Mills,
Urban Economics 259–60 (1972) (describing refundable “materials disposal tax”); Robert
M. Solow, The Economist’s Approach to Pollution and Its Control, 173 Science 498, 502
(1971) (proposing refundable “materials-use fee”).
219. See Robert Costanza & Charles Perrings, A Flexible Assurance Bonding System
for Improved Environmental Management, 2 Ecological Econ. 57, 59 (1990) (explaining
bottle-deposit system switches presumption so that “user absorbs the risk” of
environmentally damaging disposal).
220. The bonding idea has even been extended to social policy objectives, with
payouts tied to the achievement of certain social goals or improvement along particular
metrics. E.g., Ronnie Horesh, Injecting Incentives into the Solution of Social Problems:
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Nicolaus Tideman has suggested that this approach could be applied
to abandoned land.221 The fact that it can be costly to restore derelict
land to a marketable state makes abandonment problematic, at least
without some accompanying payment.222 But suppose landowners were
required to pay an amount up front sufficient to cover these costs whenever they added structures or other improvements to the land, or
engaged in uses that might impact the land’s future marketability. Then
it would be possible for the state to offer a rebate to those who chose to
voluntarily relinquish their land in good condition (e.g., free of dilapidated structures, without latent dangers in the yards and driveways, and
without environmental hazards requiring remediation).223 Even if the
property had some problems, the associated costs could simply be
deducted from the rebate, just as damages to a rental unit are deducted
from the security deposit.
Bond posting shifts risk, along with the burden of proof, to the party
posting the bond.224 In the example just given, the bond could enable a
clean exit from ownership. Bonds could also stand in for possessory ownership. A party who is thought to occupy an especially good position to
bear some risk or influence some result (but who does not need to be in
physical possession of a particular piece of property to do so) could be
required to post a bond that will be returned in whole or in part depending on actual outcomes. Thus, instead of requiring a new factory to buy
up the properties of the surrounding homeowners, the factory owner
might merely be required to post a bond that would be sufficient to cover

Social Policy Bonds, Econ. Aff., Sept. 2000, at 39 (proposing Social Policy Bonds and
outlining how they would work); OMB, Paying for Success, White House,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet/paying-for-success (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (last visited September 9, 2014) (describing Pay for Success Bonds, which base
funding on outcomes); John Roman, Social Impact Bonds: A New Model to Reduce
Blight, Huffington Post (Nov. 6, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johnroman-phd/social-impact-bonds-a-new_b_4214851.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (reporting on use of social impact bonds by local governments and suggesting
their potential as antiblight measures).
221. T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization
of Spatial Externalities, 66 Land Econ. 341, 346 (1990) (suggesting “any person who
transformed a site in a way that made it expensive to restore that site to a condition of
‘bare land’ could be required to post an interest-bearing bond that would run with the
land” to address the contingency of future abandonment). Tideman contemplated using
this approach in conjunction with a land-tax proposal that would create incentives to
strategically abandon land, id., but it could be applied whenever society stands to suffer
from the spillovers of abandonment.
222. Such a payment might be made in kind. See Strahilevitz, Right to Abandon,
supra note 7, at 419 (“An owner seeking to abandon land should be able to do so upon
cleaning up or improving the property sufficiently to give it positive market value.”).
223. Making these deposits run with the land would allow expected rebates to be
capitalized into negotiated resale prices as well.
224. E.g., Costanza & Perrings, supra note 219, at 59, 65–69.
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the “worst case scenario” effects of its noise, effluents, and vibrations.225
This bond, or a portion of it, could be returned after a period of years
based on objective measures of these impacts, or of their derived impacts
on home values.
Posting a bond is one way of linking one’s own payoffs to future
states of the world, and thereby bearing risk and accepting responsibility.
The idea can be broadened to all forms of “taking a stake” in a particular
property interest, enterprise, or outcome. While owners of possessory
interests are obviously stakeholders, it is possible to hold a stake without
being in physical possession.226 Where achieving a social goal depends on
the incentive and risk allocations associated with financial stakes, but
where the incentives in question can operate without being in physical
possession, mandatory stakeholding can be an alternative to full-strength
forced ownership.
Although the idea of forced stakeholding sounds unusual, there are
antecedents in private contracting behavior. A recent example is Apple’s
announcement that CEO Tim Cook will be required to hold ten times
his base salary in shares.227 If a person or entity is thought to be especially
well positioned to determine whether an enterprise succeeds or fails, a
required stake in the enterprise might be expected to powerfully harness
incentives.228
The model could, in theory, be extended to governmental impositions of ownership stakes. A recent proposal by Gideon Parchomovsky
and Endre Stavang would do just that, in an effort to leverage support for
environmental initiatives.229 Because stakeholding can be extended to
225. See id. at 58–59 (describing environmental bonds “designed to confront
individual resource users with the marginal social costs of the ‘worst case’ results of their
activities at the time those activities are undertaken”).
226. Investors can, for example, hold an equity stake in real property through a
derivative instrument or other equity-sharing arrangement. See, e.g., Fennell,
Homeownership, supra note 111, at 1048–49 & nn.4–5, 1064–70 (describing several such
approaches and citing related literature).
227. Adam Satariano, Apple Requires CEO Cook to Hold 10 Times Salary in Stock,
Bloomberg (Mar. 1, 2013, 8:02 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-01/applerequires-ceo-cook-to-hold-10-times-salary-in-stock.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). Other senior executive officers at Apple are required to own shares equal to three
times their base salary. Id.
228. See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of
Incentive Compatibility, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 440, 443–44 (2000) (explaining how stock
options provide incentive compatibility, absent hedging).
229. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Endre Stavang, The Environmental Option, 99
Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 3), available at http://www.cree.uio.no/
publications/2013_3/Stavang_The_Environmental_Option_CREE_WP3_2013.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (presenting proposal in which firms would be effectively
required to hold futures in “green” enterprises). Although the authors call the interest
that the firm is required to buy an “option,” it is better described as a future; the firm is
forced to buy shares from the green enterprise at a set price by a specified future date,
“even at a loss.” Id.
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parties beyond those in physical possession, it offers a flexible alternative
to co-ownership for parties whose holdings mutually spill over onto each
other’s. Indeed, the semicommons arrangement in medieval common
fields can be understood as a blunt-force way of compelling owners of
farming strips to take a stake in the fate of the field as a whole, and not
just a segregable corner of it.230 A conceptually similar approach might
be extended to communities and neighborhoods.231
By taking a stake in an outcome, a party effectively places a bet on it;
she then has an incentive to influence the outcome of that bet. Allowing
multiple parties to take stakes in a single outcome opens up the possibility of elegant solutions to otherwise intractable incentive dilemmas.232
When more than one party can influence a given outcome, assigning the
upside or downside risk to only one of them will weaken the incentives of
the others. Various ways of splitting up gains and losses are possible, but
each comes with drawbacks. Mechanisms that allow each party to bear
the full risk associated with her inputs can help to align incentives.233
The fact that certain arrangements help to align incentives does not
necessarily make out a case for mandating them. Parties might be expected to opt into beneficial stakeholding arrangements. But there are at
least two reasons why it might be helpful to keep the idea of mandatory
stakeholding on the slate of possible alternatives.
First, temporarily mandated (or even just subsidized) stakeholding
could help to generate an initial critical mass to support the development of voluntary stake-taking markets. Consider, for example, the idea
of having local residents buy shares in new developments. This “crowd230. In the medieval common-field arrangement, each individual farmer owned a
number of strips of land scattered throughout a field that was seasonally turned into a
grazing commons. See generally Smith, Semicommon Property, supra note 153
(describing this arrangement and positing that it was designed to prevent strategic use of
the commons to benefit one’s own farmland or burden that of others).
231. See Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 143, 174–75 (2010) (sketching model in which neighboring jurisdictions would be
required to buy some amount of securities indexed to each other’s local property values).
232. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. Legal Stud. 203, 204
(2002) (“When several actors affect a risk, efficient incentives require each of them to bear
the full risk.”); Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Total Liability for Excessive Harm, 36 J. Legal
Stud. 63, 64 (2007) (proposing rule that would “hold each participant in the activity
responsible for all of the excessive harm that everyone causes” where excessive harm is
defined as “difference between the total harm caused by all injurers and the optimal total
harm”).
233. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 41 (1960)
(proposing “double tax system” for both sides of a land use conflict); Robert Cooter, Unity
in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (1985)
(presenting idea of “double responsibility at the margin”). Care must be taken in
structuring these arrangements to avoid creating other distortions, however. See Nuno
Garoupa & Chris William Sanchirico, Decoupling as Transactions Tax, 39 J. Legal Stud.
469, 469–72 (2010) (characterizing legal rules structured to incentivize both plaintiff and
defendant as transactions tax that reduces joint payoffs).
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funding” idea has been floated as an antidote to NIMBYism.234 If all
homeowners in a particular residential area were automatically endowed
with a small stake in the neighboring commercial district, collective
action in support of optimal development could take hold in a way that
might not be possible if households could selectively opt in or out.235
Ultimately, the development of new stake-taking alternatives could facilitate greater risk customization opportunities than the status quo
affords.236
Second, stakeholding might be considered as either an alternative to
or an adjunct to other forms of governmental coercion. Not only might it
offer a less intrusive alternative in contexts where forced ownership is
currently used or contemplated, it could also be creatively combined with
other property incursions in some contexts. For example, Eric Posner
and Luigi Zingales have proposed combining mandatory write-downs of
underwater mortgages with grants of a share of upside appreciation
potential to the affected lenders.237 Likewise, some land readjustment
approaches grant displaced parties shares in the new enterprises that
their displacement enabled.238 In these examples, the granted stake
would presumably serve to mitigate a coercively imposed burden and
hence would not be aversive on its own, but it would nonetheless form
part of a compelled transfer.
234. See Matthew Yglesias, The Real Estate Crowdfunding Scheme that Could
Revolutionize Urban Policy by Defeating NIMBYism, Slate (June 5, 2013, 2:43 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2013/06/fundrise_real_estate_crowd
_funding_could_beat_nimbys.html/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
and critiquing this approach).
235. Similarly, tenants in gentrifying areas might be required to hold securities that
are indexed to property values—another stake-realigning move that could reduce
resistance to certain kinds of community changes. See Brendan O’Flaherty, City
Economics 369 (2005) (“Tenants could get a long-run stake in the community if they were
required to buy some variety of security that was pegged to the town’s or neighborhood’s
total property value.”); see also Robert I. Lerman & Signe-Mary McKernan, Promoting
Neighborhood Improvement While Protecting Low-Income Families, Opportunity &
Ownership Project (Urban Inst., Washington, D.C.), May 2007, at 1, 2–3, available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311457_Promoting_Neighborhood.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (proposing tenants be provided with financial instruments
indexed to area rents); Fennell & Roin, supra note 231, at 165–71 (exploring how such an
approach might be designed).
236. It might seem counterproductive to add more risk to a homeowner’s bundle,
given that homeowners already bear significant local housing market risk that they cannot
readily shed. See supra notes 209–210 and accompanying text (discussing home-equity
risk). New risk-bearing arrangements might, however, help to counter some of the risks
that are currently built into the homeowner’s default bundle—as by countering risk-averse
concerns about property values with a chance to share in the gains of new local
development. More broadly, making markets in risk more robust and familiar could speed
the development of new forms of homeownership that would unbundle certain risks that
lie outside the homeowner’s control.
237. Eric Posner & Luigi Zingales, A Loan Modification Approach to the Housing
Crisis, 11 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 575, 589–92 (2009).
238. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing land readjustment).
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When considered in conjunction with the other alternatives to
forced ownership discussed above, the possibility of stakeholding further
refines and limits the conditions in which an outright forcing would
dominate. Rather than viewing these mechanisms as falling completely
outside of the domain of forcings, however, it may be more useful to see
them as specialized instantiations of it, where the ownership interest in
question is narrowly defined to comprise a certain set of outcomes.239
V. THE USE AND MISUSE OF FORCINGS
The alternatives surveyed in the previous Part demonstrate that societal objectives associated with ownership can generally be fulfilled without the government forcing full-strength possessory ownership on an
unwilling owner. Forcings are rare, and this is as it should be. But pulling
apart the rationales for compulsory ownership raises questions about
whether forcings are used in all, and only, those situations where they
could uniquely add value. Section A considers some concrete examples
of how forcings might be extended. Section B explores how a doctrine of
forcings might be formulated and cabined. Section C rethinks existing
forms of forced ownership and briefly explores the domain of relievings,
which can offer a safety valve for socially costly unwanted ownership.
A. Extending Forcings
Could forcings serve a policy function analogous to (if more limited
than) eminent domain? Just as eminent domain represents a call option
held by the government, a forcing represents a put option that is held by
the government.240 We might initially wonder why resorting to such an
alternative would ever be necessary, given the potential to reprice
ownership or to identify willing owners through an auction process.
Unlike potential sellers, who may hold a spatial monopoly on a soughtafter parcel, potential buyers are rarely in a similarly unique position.241
They can compete against each other even when the interest in question

239. The offloading of risk can be conceptualized as the division of ownership. See
Barzel, supra note 92, at 6–7 (characterizing party who contracts to provide service for
photocopier as “a residual claimant from the servicing operation” and hence a partial
owner of the copier). By this logic, mandatory elements of risk embedded in existing
ownership forms represent a type of forcing, and government action to facilitate the
shedding of risk represents a type of relieving.
240. See supra note 6 (defining call and put options in finance and law).
241. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of
Property Rules, 106 Yale L.J. 2091, 2093 (1997) (“The holder of cash has no monopoly
position at all, so it is very hard to believe that by allowing the present holder of some
specific asset to designate the person who must take it off his hands, we advance any
conceivable measure of social welfare.”).
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carries negative value, as airline passengers do in the context of oversold
flights.242
Sometimes, however, potential buyers also have monopoly power.243
Encroachment and accession cases offer simple examples where restoring unified ownership in complementary goods requires either a purchase or a sale between two specified parties.244 Similarly, the government might wish to produce a particular spatial pattern of land
ownership that packages together complementarities or that disperses
ownership among existing landholders in specified ways.245 Just as the
government is not always able to buy up the aggregated patterns of land
necessary for certain public projects through purely voluntary transactions, so too may it sometimes encounter difficulty getting existing owners to take up ownership in particular patterns, where doing so is
necessary to achieve some social goal.
As this analysis suggests, the most likely scenarios for normatively
justified forcings would involve complementarities between an owner’s
current properties and related or adjacent properties that she does not
yet own. Her current holdings may make related or adjacent properties
difficult for another party to effectively manage, so that if she goes on
owning what she currently holds, it is efficient for her to take on
ownership of the other property as well. By way of illustration, consider
the following ways in which this idea might be applied to generate new
forms of forcings.
1. Alternatives to Eminent Domain. — In some instances, a forcing
could be presented to the owner as an alternative to eminent domain. To
see the niche that a forcings approach might fill, it is first helpful to step
back and consider what eminent domain accomplishes for society. It
does not just aggregate together the parcels of land necessary to accommodate uses like highways or urban redevelopment. It also consolidates
ownership of that land.246 But why? Lloyd Cohen provocatively explores
242. See, e.g., Inhaber, NIMBY, supra note 123, at 44–46 (describing airline reverse
auction and recommending applying its principles to other bads, such as waste facility
siting); see also supra notes 123, 204 and accompanying text (discussing auctions to
allocate bads).
243. See Ayres, supra note 6, at 19–20 (observing that both buyer and seller have
monopoly power when the two are locked in a bilateral monopoly situation).
244. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text (discussing these examples).
245. For example, in an effort to combat blight, the government might want to make
sure all homes are occupied on a given block. Or, to make a developer internalize the cost
of infrastructure improvements, a local government might require her to own land
sufficient to encompass the minimum efficient scale for a new arterial road. The reason
for actually requiring ownership in the latter case rather than simply imposing an impact
fee might be uncertainty about the extent, type, and cost of infrastructure that would be
required, which might depend in some measure on aspects of the developer’s project that
are difficult to specify in advance.
246. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three
Dimensions, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1015, 1020 (2008) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky,
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this question in his analysis of holdouts.247 He posits that if there were no
transaction costs, holdouts would not be a problem because they could
simply retain separate ownership.248 The would-be holdout could continue to own, say, an area within the footprint of a newly developed
department store, which he could seamlessly operate as part of the
store.249
Given the costs of coordination and monitoring, however, the idea
breaks down—owners of store fragments could harm each other and
benefit themselves with impunity.250 The corner holdout might steal merchandise from, or toss garbage into, the other portion of the store, or he
might simply invest too little in improving the store’s reputation, given
that he will reap only a fraction of the benefits. These are, of course,
standard “tragedy of the commons” arguments against dividing or sharing ownership in certain ways.251 The key point is that the allocation of
ownership itself matters, given the costs of delivering access to resources.
And eminent domain is a well-known method for overcoming the holdout problems that impede achieving unified ownership in situations
where aggregation of separate holdings is necessary. But it is not the only
way to achieve such an aggregation.
Suppose, for example, that our department-store holdout were given
a choice between having his property condemned through eminent
domain or buying out the developer’s assembled land holdings
instead.252 A landowner who placed a high value on retaining possession
of his portion of the property could elect the purchase option. Presumably, the opportunity cost of underutilizing a large consolidated holding
Reconfiguring] (“A three-dimensional analysis recognizes that the problem [of land
assembly] may be viewed in several ways: too many owners, too small assets, or too much
dominion (power to hold out).”).
247. Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. Legal Stud. 351 (1991).
248. See id. at 353 (observing that no property would need to change hands to
coordinate use in zero-transaction-cost world).
249. Id.
250. See id. at 354 (noting preclusive effect of these costs).
251. See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243, 1244
(1968) (giving example of a grazing pasture in which costs of individual herders’ decisions
to add grazing animals are shared among all herders). Not all common-ownership
schemes end in tragedy, of course. See, e.g., Ostrom, supra note 152, at 58–102
(examining enduring common-pool resource institutions and identifying design
principles associated with them).
252. Such an approach resembles the sets of remedial choices offered to parties in
encroachment and accession cases. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
Depending on the assessment method used to determine the compensation level and the
buyout price, the model might also resemble certain techniques for dividing property held
in common. Under the “Shotgun” approach to business dissolution, for example, one
party states a value for shares of the business and the other party can choose to either buy
out or be bought out at that price. See, e.g., Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier,
Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev.
203, 205–06 (2014) (describing Shotgun mechanism and citing related literature).
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would prompt an owner to employ the property in what society would
regard as its highest and best use. But if he did not, he would bear the
associated cost.
2. Mandating Development Bundles. — Purchases might also be compelled where eminent domain is not in play. For example, in a case of
purely private development, the government might wish to place more
property under one owner’s control than would be independently
selected by the developer, perhaps to generate positive externalities for
the surrounding area. Similarly, a local government might address the
concerns of the surrounding community by allowing residents or businesses to force purchases of their properties on developers who would
transform an area in ways that would make them wish to leave. Indeed,
the government could extend such an option to local residents in conjunction with its own proposed exercises of eminent domain, allowing
nearby landowners who were not part of the original condemnation plan
to compel the government to buy up their properties as well.253
Unwanted properties could also be bundled into larger packages
that buyers, such as developers, would find attractive, and offered on an
all-or-nothing basis. Land banks capable of consolidating large blocks of
ownership for conveyance could prove instrumental in such a strategy.254
Easing land assembly represents a valuable subsidy that might induce
developers to accept problematic properties and their associated liabilities as part of larger packages that also contain some desirable properties. By controlling the size and configuration of the entire bundle, such
an approach can channel property to buyers who are in a good position
to absorb or remediate the potential negative spillovers that would otherwise be associated with individual problematic lots.
3. Owning Consequence Zones. — Scholars have already examined how
put options might be used in place of other nuisance remedies.255 However, the analysis has typically focused on the question of being forced to
buy an entitlement to, say, emit pollutants.256 A different model would
253. See Bell & Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring, supra note 246, at 1064–65 (discussing
possibility eminent domain might at times take too little property rather than too much).
254. See, e.g., Jon Hurdle, Philadelphia Forges Plan to Rebuild from Decay, N.Y.
Times (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/01/realestate/commercial/aland-bank-is-forged-for-decaying-blocks-in-philadelphia.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (reporting on Philadelphia Land Bank’s plans, which include consolidating
ownership of blocks that would be attractive to developers).
255. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 6, at 29–37 (describing how put options might be
incorporated into nuisance law).
256. See, e.g., id. at 29 (discussing possibility of “forcing the defendant to purchase
the prospective nuisance right”). It is unclear whether a polluter could be required to
purchase an ongoing emission right. See Epstein, Protecting Property, supra note 19, at
843 (observing that defendant cannot be forced to continue polluting and suggesting only
temporary damages could be imposed on defendant who elected to shut down instead). If
permanent damages were available, however, this could be conceptualized as forcing the
polluter to buy a limited property interest in the affected property. See Boomer v. Atl.
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involve the compulsory purchase of the affected property itself, triggered
by the initial pollution decision. Rather than face liability for particular
consequences or pay in advance for expected impacts, landowners could
be required to own “consequence zones”—physical places where those
impacts are realized. For instance, residents who are bothered by a
nearby factory could be given the option to force the sale of their fee
simple interests to the factory. At that point, the polluter could decide
whether to continue polluting what is now her own land, or shut down
her operations instead. Under certain circumstances, forcing the sale of
the fee interest might offer advantages over the more well-studied model
of forcing the sale of just the entitlement to emit.
First, in cases where there is sharp disagreement about the actual
impacts that will be realized over time, a transfer of ownership may offer
both parties a more acceptable solution than permanent damages based
on an expected value.257 Second, putting ownership into the same hands
avoids the kinds of incentive problems going forward that have been
raised in the permanent damages context.258 A polluter who has already
paid permanent damages may not innovate to reduce harm even when it
could be done cost effectively, but a polluter who owns the land that will
be polluted would retain that incentive.259 The solution is also better
incentive-wise than a series of damage judgments over time that would
reflect realized harm, at least to the extent that the victims in the story
could influence the impacts that they will suffer. A single owner will
pursue whichever alternative offers the highest payoff, whether taking
precautions on the adjacent land, adding scrubbers to the factory, or
doing nothing at all.260
Consequence-zone ownership need not invariably be imposed on
the party that desires the more active or invasive use. It would also be
possible to make the party with a complaint about a neighbor’s use buy
up that neighbor’s property. New Jersey’s conditional variances, in which
Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970) (characterizing permanent damages
awarded in case as placing servitude on affected land).
257. While it might seem that one party is bound to be wrong, the ability of parties to
influence outcomes can turn the game into a positive-sum one. Another approach to
uncertainty about impacts is to use a bonding mechanism that provides refunds based on
actual results, as discussed above. See supra Part IV.C.
258. See Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 876 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (“[O]nce such permanent
damages are assessed and paid, the incentive to alleviate the wrong would be eliminated,
thereby continuing air pollution of an area without abatement.”).
259. As with all other inefficiencies, the shortfall in postpayment innovation is the
product of positive transaction costs. See Coase, supra note 233, at 8 (observing valuemaximizing result will be reached regardless of how legal entitlements are assigned “if the
pricing system is assumed to work without cost”). If the residents could costlessly bargain
with the factory to invent a better pollution stopper, this would occur. But of course if the
residents could costlessly bargain with the factory, there would have been no need for a
lawsuit and an award of permanent damages in the first place.
260. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing single-owner approach).
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stopping the grant of a variance means purchasing the property in question, does something very much like this.261 Consistent with the Coasean
idea of reciprocal harm,262 the objecting neighbor is required to absorb
the negative impact that her demands have on the value of the nearby
property—the opportunity cost of keeping the land in its current use.263
If forced purchases sound like extreme overkill in managing spillovers and a radical departure from current practices, consider the fact
that zoning laws routinely do something very similar. People are not
allowed to acquire and use property interests of any size and shape
whatever. While concerns about later reconfiguration costs represent one
rationale, a more basic one is that too-small holdings produce a profusion of boundary lines and hence more spillovers that must be managed
at positive cost.264 Indeed, Peter Colwell has observed that governmentally imposed land use restrictions could be jettisoned altogether if holdings were required to be large enough (he gives the example of 640
acres) and edges were subject to certain requirements (such as “very tall
berms”).265
There are countervailing considerations, of course. As Yoram Barzel
has observed, there are disadvantages of consolidating ownership in one
person or entity, including scale mismatches between labor and nonlabor
inputs and specialization losses.266 Yet zoning operates prophylactically to
mandate minimum bundles for all (even if they are orders of magnitude
smaller than in Colwell’s thought experiment). Because forcings could
operate more selectively where spillovers have actually shown themselves
261. Ownership is not actually forced on the neighbor under New Jersey’s
conditional-variance model; rather, her ability to defeat the variance depends on her
willingness to buy the property. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
262. Coase, supra note 233, at 2.
263. A related idea would be to permit parties burdened by servitudes to force
ownership of their parcels onto the dominant estate owner under specified circumstances.
An intriguing example of this approach is found in Italian law. Codice Civile [C.c.] art.
1070 (It.), translated in 3 The Italian Civil Code and Complementary Legislation 232
(Mario Beltramo et al. trans., 2007) (providing that owner of servient estate who finds
himself under unwanted obligations such as maintaining an easement “can always free
himself by renouncing ownership of the servient land in favor of the owner of the
dominant land”).
264. Similar points can be made about irregularly shaped parcels. See Gary D.
Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Property
Institutions, 119 J. Pol. Econ. 426, 450–53 (2011) (finding in empirical study in central
Ohio that irregular parcels demarcated by metes-and-bounds system generated more
property disputes than otherwise similar property demarcated by rectangular system). The
rectangular system of demarcation effectively forces ownership of those portions of the
land contained in the rectangular footprint that the landowner would have preferred not
to include in her holding. See id. at 427–28 (explaining how preset size, shape, and
alignment mandated by rectangular system reduces flexibility to achieve standardization).
265. Peter F. Colwell, Tender Mercies: Efficient and Equitable Land Use Change, 25
Real Est. Econ. 525, 529 n.6 (1997).
266. Barzel, supra note 92, at 51–52 (detailing “costs of sole ownership”).
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to be troublesome, they would not necessarily increase average parcel
size and could indeed diminish the incidence of unwanted ownership of
excess land.
4. Addressing Territoriality. — A forcings model might also be used to
align ownership bundles with observed patterns of territorial behavior.
Consider the phenomenon of homeowners claiming exclusive rights in
the street parking spots that their homes front upon.267 Allowing private
parties to assert exclusive control over public parking spaces is problematic because it impedes the efficient rotation of cars in and out of spaces
over the course of a day or week.268 One prescription is to deny private
claims over the spaces to ensure that they remain in the commons.
The analysis here suggests another alternative that builds on rather
than fights owners’ territorial impulses.269 The adjacent landowners
could be required to purchase rights to the parking spaces that front
their homes or businesses, and then be allowed to market those rights
(either directly, or through services that emerge to handle such transactions) in exchange for micropayments from parkers.270 Such exchanges
have become feasible at low cost due to the ubiquity of smartphones that
can be equipped with parking apps.271 If it becomes possible for would-be
267. A particularly intense (albeit episodic) subspecies of the problem is found in the
“dibs barriers” that Chicagoans use to mark claims over spaces that they have dug out of
the snow. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public
Roads, 31 J. Legal Stud. S515, S528–33 (2002).
268. See id. at S527 (noting impact on road’s “carrying capacity” of granting
permanent rights in parking spaces).
269. A similarly motivated approach appears in Donald Shoup, The High Cost of
Free Parking (2005). As Shoup explains, “Many residents seem to think they own the
parking spaces in front of their homes, or at least they act that way. So rather than fighting
this thought, cities can accept it and take advantage of it by treating residents like the
landlords they think they are.” Id. at 434.
270. If individual ownership of parking rights proved too difficult to implement,
collective ownership of the parking rights by a group of adjacent residents is another
possible approach. See, e.g., id. at 434–53 (proposing “parking benefit districts” that
would grant residents free parking in their neighborhoods but would charge nonresidents
to park and would earmark resulting revenue for use within district); see also George W.
Liebmann, The Little Platoons: Sub-Local Governments in Modern History 58 (1995)
(describing approach used in St. Louis County in which “title to the bed of a street is
deeded to the residents adjacent to it, subject to assessments enforceable by lien,” with
streets then managed by trustees elected by owners’ association).
271. The recently developed MonkeyParking app, although currently disabled
following a cease-and-desist letter from the San Francisco City Attorney, illustrates the
technical capacity to use app-enabled smartphones to transact over parking in real time.
See Kate Conger, MonkeyParking App Shuts Down Under Pressure from City Attorney,
S.F. Examiner (July 10, 2014), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/monkeyparkingapp-shuts-down-under-pressure-from-city-attorney/Content?oid=2846688 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing app, which enabled drivers vacating street parking
spaces in San Francisco to auction access to those spots to other drivers, and reporting on
MonkeyParking’s decision to suspend service); see also Press Release, Office of the City
Att’y, City & Cnty. of S.F., Herrera Tells Monkey Parking to Drop Mobile App for
Auctioning City Parking Spots (June 23, 2014), http://www.sfcityattorney.org/index.aspx?
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parkers to quickly learn about available spaces and pay to occupy them,
the landowners would be confronted with the opportunity cost of keeping spaces permanently out of circulation. While some might choose to
bear the expense, most presumably would not.272
*

*

*

All of these ideas suggest that forcings are most plausible in
instances where there is a particular owner who, because of her other
holdings (or proposed other holdings), is especially well positioned to
also own the properties in question.273 Contrast with this model the idea
of turning ownership of unwanted parcels into a randomly imposed civic
burden, like the military draft or jury duty.274 To make such an idea minimally workable, it would be necessary to carefully define the eligible pool
and place restrictions on reconveyance.275 However, a lottery among
subsidized (and prescreened) volunteers or an auction designed to find
the eligible person who will accept the property at the lowest negative
price would likely be more attractive alternatives. Unless there is some
civic value generated by the random assignment itself, or the random
assignment is simply much cheaper to operate,276 mechanisms facilitating
voluntary transfers appear preferable.
B. Toward a Forcings Doctrine
The discussion to this point has established that forced ownership
tends to be most plausible in settings where the owner has already
voluntarily undertaken ownership (or some other possessory action) with
page=599 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing cease-and-desist letter
alleging that app violates city code prohibiting transactions over public on-street parking).
272. Cf. Shoup, supra note 269, at 434–40 (predicting “parking benefit districts” that
earmark nonresident parking payments for district services would generate political
support for pricing that allows curb space to be well utilized throughout the day, while
retaining vacancy rates sufficient for resident parking).
273. Cf. Merrill, Accession, supra note 19, at 488–91 (describing accession as way of
identifying fit owner).
274. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements 53–78 (1989) (discussing use of
randomization strategies to allocate goods and bads).
275. For example, perhaps only residents within a certain radius of the subject
property would be included. Screens based on income and credit history (or willingness to
post a bond) could be applied to ensure that the person would be in a position to bear the
obligations of ownership, and hardship exemptions could be made available to those who
lacked sufficient time or liquidity to manage the property. Restrictions on reconveyance
would be necessary to ensure that the goals of the program would not be undone through
reconveyance to, say, a judgment-proof individual.
276. One reason it could be cheaper to operate relates to adverse selection. People
who take on ownership burdens for pay may be willing to do so for less money if they know
they have a greater capacity to dodge the obligations of ownership (if, for example, they
are judgment-proof or impervious to reputational sanctions). This possibility puts more
pressure on the screening mechanisms than in a purely volunteer or randomized system.
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regard to a connected or complementary interest. This is because coercion will only dominate other alternatives (such as an auction) where a
particular party is the sole logical choice to take on ownership of a
particular property, effectively giving her monopoly leverage over the
purchase decision. The typical source of that leverage will be a party’s
existing holdings or possessory interests. The question then becomes
whether requiring ownership of this additional interest is a type of burden for which compensation is due, or whether it should be understood
as a normatively appropriate uncompensated adjunct to the voluntary
ownership interest.
Evaluating the burdens associated with forced ownership raises questions that are familiar from regulatory takings doctrine, though not easily
resolved. What kinds of background conditions are (or should be)
understood to inherently condition title?277 How much should it matter if
one had notice of an unwanted restriction before one acted or invested?278 Which economic burdens and thwarted expectations must be
borne without payment?279 When is an owner being required to confer
benefits on society, the costs of which should be spread more broadly?280
All of the difficulties and unanswered questions that plague takings law
find counterparts in forcings analysis.281 An initial question, however, is
whether the Takings Clause is even the right doctrinal focus for forcings
analysis.
1. Are Forcings Takings? — Recognizing the commonalities between
forcings and takings might suggest that forcings can be comfortably
277. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (requiring
compensation when government action deprives property of all economically viable use,
except where limitation “inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership”).
278. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626–30 (2001) (holding that
ownership change following regulation does not bar takings claim).
279. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (setting
forth factors to determine whether taking has occurred, including “[t]he economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct, investment backed expectations,” and “the
character of the government action”).
280. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (noting Court
has “emphasized [the Takings Clause’s] role in ‘bar[ring] Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960))).
281. For example, the possibility that courts as well as the political branches can
engage in takings raises the question of whether a corresponding doctrine of judicial
forcings should be developed. See Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“If a legislature or a court declares
that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken
that property, no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its value
by regulation.”).
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folded into existing takings law. To some extent this is true. As a matter
of constitutional doctrine, the Takings Clause is probably the right place
to locate the analysis of burdens associated with property ownership—
including the burden of additional or prolonged property ownership.
Indeed, the forced ownership of a property interest that is complementary to or otherwise related to something one previously voluntarily
acquired can be characterized as a reduction in the value of that other
voluntarily owned interest. On this account, the forced ownership of a
related or complementary property interest is like any other aversive
strand that law might place in the property bundle, such as a restriction
on the way in which land can be used.282 This does not mean a given forcing will necessarily count as a compensable taking, but it does make the
Takings Clause a comfortable fit for assessing whether such a compensable event has occurred.
The analysis becomes trickier when the precondition for unwanted
ownership is not another form of ownership, but rather some other activity, such as conversion. In these cases, it is hard to identify any property
interest that has been compromised, since the triggering condition is
tortious behavior and ownership first appears as a penalty. However,
remedies like trover could actually be characterized as involving ownership interests through something like a doctrine of relation back. Having
broken the thing, it is as if one acquired it before the breakage happened. One is made retroactively responsible in a way that is indistinguishable from having been the thing’s owner at the moment one first
laid hands on it. It is this earlier proto-ownership relationship that is
altered as a result of the remedial regime. Nonetheless, it is questionable
whether the Takings Clause can be stretched to reach this case.
In a broad sense, the Takings Clause could be viewed as a countermajoritarian check against burdensome governmental interferences with
one’s chosen property arrangements, whether those arrangements
involve ownership or nonownership. Doctrinally, however, forcings that
are not linked to voluntary property ownership sit uncomfortably in the
takings framework. Moreover, because these forcings tend to be remedial
in nature, the Due Process Clause would offer a more natural analytic
hook for assessing their constitutionality. Because of their remedial flavor, accompanying them with compensation would make little sense;
they must instead stand or fall on the basis of their ability to remedy a
wrong. Either such forcings are legitimate governmental acts that require
no compensation, or they are illegitimate governmental acts that are forbidden outright.
282. Indeed, some takings challenges involve use limits that could be recast in the
language of forced retention. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412–16
(1922) (finding taking where law required coal company to keep specified amount of coal
in place to prevent subsidence); supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing rent
stabilization law that constrained ability to change land use). Thanks to an anonymous
reviewer for comments on this point.
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Importantly, the Takings Clause presupposes legitimate action that
requires for its validation only the payment of just compensation.283 The
Due Process Clause and other constitutional provisions guard against
illegitimate government conduct that cannot be validated through
payment.284 To the extent that forcings interfere with liberty interests or
violate other constitutional provisions, they could not be legitimated
through the payment of compensation. The idea of compensated forcings presupposes, however, that there are some forms of forced ownership that are legitimate if (and only if) they are compensated. The idea is
intuitive: The normative justifications for imposing ownership cannot
always be expected to line up with situations in which the distributive
consequences of forced ownership are justified. But as a doctrinal matter,
there is room for debate about the extent, and even the existence, of a
zone in which forcings are both permissible and compensable.
2. When Are Forcings Compensable Events? — In deciding whether a
permissible forcing requires compensation, the correct normative analysis would have much in common with takings analysis insofar as it
involves a search for baselines, an analysis of deviations from those baselines, and consideration of the extent to which investment-backed
expectations have been undermined. When is ownership itself the sort of
burden or surprise or burdensome surprise that makes its uncompensated imposition normatively problematic? These inquiries always
threaten to turn circular in the takings context, and the same is true
when it comes to forcings.
To structure the inquiry, it is helpful to go back to the question of
bundling and consider whether the unwanted ownership interest helps
to internalize costs that the owner has otherwise inflicted or instead
offloads costs onto the owner. Is the law merely squaring things up so
that the owner shoulders burdens commensurate with her own operations in the world, or has it slipped into the owner’s domain an extra
burden that the owner should not by rights have to bear? In the first case,
forced ownership removes a distortion so that ownership’s built-in incentive structure can operate unimpeded. In the second case, ownership is
imposed to glean some set of societal benefits that the owner has no duty
to provide. This need not mean that the forcing is normatively off limits.
Perhaps the benefits it would provide cannot be acquired at all, or cannot be acquired as cost effectively, through mere monetary obligations. If

283. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543 (explaining that Takings Clause “does not bar
government from interfering with property rights, but rather requires compensation”
where such interferences are otherwise valid).
284. See id. (observing “no amount of compensation can authorize” an
impermissible governmental act, such as one that violates due process).
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the forcing is cost justified but the burden it imposes is not distributively
justified, compensation might be used in conjunction with coercion.285
This normative bifurcation tracks that in the takings arena. In that
context, instead of coercively imposing or augmenting ownership, the
government is coercively taking away ownership, or whittling it down.286
Because “takings” is a constitutional term of art that implies mandatory
compensation, takings must always be compensated. However, many governmental acts affecting property rights do not require compensation,
either because they do not go “too far”287 or because they are categorically exempt from takings analysis.288 Some incursions into property
rights are deemed normatively appropriate without compensation
because they address impacts that the owner never had any right to
impose. The so-called nuisance exception to the Takings Clause is the
clearest example of the “background principles” that condition title.289
Someone whose use of land generates serious negative externalities can
be shut down without compensation, even at great economic loss.290
In other cases, however, the individual has a clear normative right to
the property interest in question, but her continued ownership imposes
social costs that make it efficient for the state to end it through a taking.
For example, a landowner’s property may stand in the way of the only
viable path for a highway or rail line that would add enormous social
value. If the constitutional requirement of public use is met, the taking
can proceed, but just compensation is required. The forcings analogue
might be a situation in which the owner’s voluntary holdings are harmless in themselves but leave behind some adjacent area that cannot be
usefully managed by any other owner. Before concluding that forcing
285. This assumes that other normative hurdles are cleared, and that it is possible to
compensate for the losses in question. See infra text accompanying notes 307–309
(discussing potentially noncompensable autonomy concerns).
286. Thus, where forcings can be recast as mandatory bundling, takings can be recast
as mandatory unbundling. When property is taken through eminent domain, ownership
tomorrow is unbundled from ownership yesterday; the unified fee simple package is
coercively split. Lesser incursions into property rights may remove certain prerogatives of
ownership or physically commandeer certain pieces of a given parcel.
287. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (Holmes, J.) (“[W]hile property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”). In most
circumstances, the applicable test for determining whether a compensable regulatory
taking has occurred is the one laid out in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39 (quoting Penn Central and
reiterating primacy of its multifactor test).
288. See, e.g., David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, Property: Takings 110–20 (2002)
(describing categories of governmental action exempted from Takings Clause scrutiny).
289. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–30 (1992) (identifying
nuisance abatement as “background principle” that conditions title and holding nuisance
control measures will not constitute compensable takings even when all economically
viable use is eliminated).
290. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410–14 (1915) (holding Los
Angeles could shut down brickworks without compensation).
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such ownership is a compensable event, however, it is necessary to consider the extent to which the bundling of interests was part of the original bargain that the owner made.
Where new or continuing ownership obligations are known to attach
in a categorical way to other or earlier ownership choices, the added
ownership burden is not a surprise and arguably does not interfere with
any reasonable investment-backed expectations.291 On the contrary, the
bundling of later ownership obligations with earlier choices may be crucial to generating proper upstream incentives. Significantly, one can
reject the package by never becoming an owner in the first place.292
Where ownership obligations attach to nonownership conduct (such as
tortious behavior), rejection of the package may take the form of
changes in primary behavior. Thus, for example, people may interact less
with the chattels of others if they run the risk of being forced to purchase
anything that they damage.293
In some cases, these avoidance behaviors may be socially valuable.
Indeed, they may be the entire point of the bundling exercise in question. For example, Ian Ayres has suggested that put options could provide valuable deterrence where they are granted to victims upon the
invasion of their property interests.294 Similarly, making property
interests harder to alienate makes them less attractive to those who would
acquire them only to gain bargaining leverage over another party.295
Scholars have also suggested that prohibitions on abandonment may
generate socially valuable decisions about entering into and carrying on
ownership.296 For example, an owner might be more reluctant to dump
291. Cf. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(suggesting landowner’s post-restriction acquisition could factor into analysis of
investment-backed expectations in takings claim). But cf. id. at 636–37 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (disagreeing with Justice O’Connor’s analysis and opining that timing of
acquisition relative to restriction “should have no bearing” on takings analysis where
“‘background principles’” like nuisance are not involved (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1029)).
292. Obviously, would-be owners are unlikely to swear off ownership altogether in
response to a given aversive bundle; rather, they will attempt to find bundles that have
acceptable expected values and risks. See Strahilevitz, Right to Abandon, supra note 7, at
400–02 (suggesting limits on abandonment may lead to less risk taking in initial
acquisition decisions).
293. See Epstein, Protecting Property, supra note 19, at 850 (suggesting forcedpurchase remedy would overdeter innocent converters).
294. See Ayres, supra note 6, at 34–36 (discussing this deterrence function, while
noting risk of overdeterrence if strike price is not set appropriately).
295. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of
Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 71–78 (1999) (examining inalienability
as means to control strategic wielding of legal rights); Fennell, Alienability, supra note 9,
at 1429–42 (explaining how inalienability could address strategic dilemmas by dampening
incentives to acquire entitlements).
296. See Strahilevitz, Right to Abandon, supra note 7, at 400 (“[A] regime that
prevents individuals from abandoning real property might encourage them to use the
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waste on her land if she knew she could not abandon and move on when
the accumulation of discarded material causes the property to turn negative in value.297 Equally important, a would-be owner bent on such behavior might decide not to become an owner at all if she knew abandonment would be impossible.
To be sure, it is far from clear that bundling of ownership interests
reliably creates this kind of positive pressure on upstream decisionmaking. For example, the inability to end an ownership relationship on one’s
own initiative could actually produce harmful selection effects ex ante—
owners who self-select not for their willingness to accept costs associated
with unwanted retention, but rather for their ability to offload the bulk
of those costs on society.298 But to the extent that bundling of ownership
interests is designed to put pressure on earlier acquisition decisions,
compensating for the forced element would undo that pressure. One way
to express this point doctrinally is to say that the voluntarily acquired
property interest is already conditioned by the possibility of the later
involuntary interest, so that the value of the former is not diminished by
any burdens that the latter might impose. The involuntary ownership
interest is, on this account, just another incident of ownership.
There is a risk of tautology here. If unwanted ownership obligations
that follow voluntary acquisition of some other property interest can
always be interpreted as incidents of that initial ownership relationship,
there would seem to be no logical limit to the types of unwanted ownership that the government could tack onto landowners’ existing holdings
without compensation. A parallel concern in the regulatory takings arena
led the Court to reject the idea that all regulations existing at the time a
landowner acquired the property automatically become background limitations on title that could not be challenged as takings.299 Some principle external to the government’s choice to impose a burden is necessary
to define the sorts of burdens that owners will be understood to have
signed on to accept.
property in a more sustainable way.”); see also Peñalver, Illusory Right, supra note 7, at
214 (“The common law’s distrust of abandonment seems less alien and arbitrary if we
approach it from the perspective of a community in which things are acquired, not in
anticipation of quickly throwing them away, but to be kept and (re)used, or perhaps
resold or given away.”).
297. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, Right to Abandon, supra note 7, at 401 (“Were it to
prohibit abandonment, the law might encourage land owners to evaluate their own
practices with a longer time horizon in mind, shifting strategies from slash-and-burn to
techniques more in line with maximizing the long term value of the property.”).
298. For example, a judgment-proof owner who flees the premises when the property
value turns negative (and who is also invulnerable to reputational pressures to take
responsibility for it) probably cannot be made to bear the costs of her earlier bad decisions
with respect to the property. See id. (noting sale to judgment-proof buyer could thwart
ban on abandonment).
299. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (“[Some] enactments
are unreasonable and do not become less so through passage of time or title.”).
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In the forcings context, examining the nature of the existing and
new property interests to determine whether the two plausibly fit
together to internalize costs offers one possible limiting principle.
Another possibility would be to consider whether the added, involuntary
property interest is one that usually delivers positive value and is conferred in a blanket manner on all owners of the predicate interest. If it is
merely a matter of luck whether, say, a baby animal in a given case happens to have negative rather than positive value for the owner of the
animal’s mother, there is less concern about owners being singled out for
burdensome treatment.300 The blanket application of the rule would also
provide a firmer basis for establishing owners’ expectations than would
ad hoc impositions of new ownership burdens.
By contrast, consider a new ownership burden that is imposed not
simply as a matter of course, but rather because one’s existing property
holdings have combined with a set of emerging circumstances to produce a situation in which one’s ownership of the new interest would be
socially desirable. Examples might include land assembly or development
contexts in which it is socially valuable for a given owner to accept
responsibility for a larger set of parcels than she would prefer—where
doing so is not designed to internalize nuisance-like externalities of
development and goes beyond what existing development rules have
required of other owners. Smaller-scale examples might include requiring neighbors to take possession of stray bits of adjacent land that cannot
be reasonably put to use by others. It is of course possible to take issue
with these particular examples, but the point is simply that circumstances
may exist in which the economic burden of a forcing lacks normative
justification, but the forcing itself would add social value. These are circumstances in which a compensated forcing might be considered.
3. Compensation. — If just compensation were required for a forcing,
what would it look like? A likely starting point is fair market value, the
constitutional touchstone for eminent domain.301 In the case of condemnation, the government exercises a call option; it pays out money
and receives property. In a forcing, by contrast, property moves from the
government to the private landowner—a governmental exercise of a put
option. The amount of money that changes hands, and the direction in
which the money flows, depends on the strike price for that put option. If
the property’s fair market value is positive, this would seem to call for the
government to collect money, not pay it out—although an offset of some
sort might remain appropriate in light of the forced nature of the
transfer. It is also entirely possible for property to carry a negative fair
market value, depending on the obligations that go with the ownership
300. See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1333,
1344–48 (1991) (noting concerns about “singling out” in takings context).
301. See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (“The
Court . . . has employed the concept of fair market value to determine the condemnee’s
loss”).
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interest in question. Thus, the strike price for the governmental exercise
of a put option might be either positive or negative.302 Typically, though,
at least some of the compensation due would be provided in kind
through the ownership interest itself.
Eminent domain is controversial in significant part because of factors for which the government’s just compensation measure does not
adequately compensate.303 Mirror-image concerns arise in the case of
forcings. First, there is the question of how and whether subjective valuations should play into compensation. In place of the positive subjective
premium typically attributed to existing owners, there is a presumptive
subjective deficit associated with forced ownership. Just as we can assume
most condemnees have valuations above fair market value (given that
they have not already sold),304 we can assume that most forced purchasers
have valuations below fair market value (given that they have not already
bought).
Second, whereas condemnees are deprived of opportunities to realize gains that exceed the expected returns built into fair market value,
forced purchasers are made to bear the risk of loss to the extent
ownership assigns them actual outcomes.305 Thus takings swap an
expected value (derived through fair market value) for an actual
outcome, while forcings do the opposite. If people are risk averse, there
would be an asymmetry between the two situations.306 While just
compensation (as currently constitutionally defined) does not give riskpreferring condemnees anything for losing out on the chance to
experience variable outcomes, there may be a stronger case for
compensating forced owners for bearing the risk of variable outcomes,
rather than simply pegging compensation to the expected values
302. A negative strike price would mean that the holder of the option (here, the
government) could force ownership on an individual, but would have to pay the
individual. Viewed from another angle, the government in this scenario might be said to
hold a call option that enables it to pay a positive price to engage in an activity that
imposes costs: the offloading of ownership. Nothing turns on which term is used. Because
puts usually involve forcing ownership onto another party, that terminology is used here.
303. See, e.g., Dukeminier et al., supra note 14, at 1077 (suggesting level of
compensation at least partially explains why property owners are concerned about scope
of “public use”).
304. See, e.g., James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 Mich. St. L.
Rev. 859, 866 (positing that landowners subject to eminent domain hold positive
consumer surplus in their properties “for otherwise owners would already have sold their
holdings on the market”).
305. It is also true that condemnees may be saved from experiencing actual losses,
and that forced purchasers may experience actual gains. The text focuses on the aversive
side of the compelled change in ownership.
306. A person is risk averse if she prefers a set of outcomes with lower variance over
one with higher variance, despite equivalent expected values. See, e.g., Jonathan Baron,
Thinking and Deciding 516 (4th ed. 2008) (observing that losing $100,000 likely generates
more than 100 times more disutility than losing $1,000, given diminishing marginal utility
of money).
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embedded in fair market value. The analysis might depend in part on
whether forcings are applied to individuals, who are likely to be risk
averse, or to large commercial entities that are likely to be risk neutral.
Third, as already noted, there is an autonomy or dignitary interest
that is implicated to the extent that ownership affects one’s selfdefinition.307 This consideration is the trickiest to address, just as in the
case of eminent domain, because it is not truly amenable to monetary
compensation. In the forcings context, autonomy concerns might be
addressed either by allowing an escape hatch,308 or by limiting the uses of
forcings to contexts where autonomy concerns are unlikely to be implicated. Here, it would be fruitful to consider differences with respect to
autonomy among types of owners and types of property. Imposing
ownership on large corporations might present fewer autonomy
concerns than imposing ownership on individuals, and fungible property
interests might present fewer autonomy concerns than properties of a
more personal nature.309
C. From Forcings to Relievings
While it is interesting to examine ways in which forcings might be
extended, it is equally important to consider whether some existing forcings are not really justified, or should be augmented by relievings.
1. Rethinking Existing Forcings. — There is no reason for burdens to
be imposed in the form of ownership if ownership itself does not produce advantages. In considering the advantages of ownership, this Article
has focused primarily on the ability of possessory ownership to deliver
actual outcomes going forward. However, sometimes the advantages that
ownership produces are not of this nature; they instead involve economizing on information costs about past and present events.
Consider again the remedies of accession and trover.310 Here, the
reason for assigning ownership may simply be to save society the costs of
figuring out damages. Yet it is quite possible that society could readily put
a figure to the costs of calculating damages. An actor who is willing to bear
those calculation costs (as well as the costs of the damages themselves,
once calculated) could be relieved of ownership without imposing any
costs on society as a whole. Similarly, abandonment may be primarily
socially costly because it creates confusion or involves the offloading of
land that has already been damaged in some way. If these costs could be
covered, as through a bonding mechanism, ending ownership would not

307. See supra text accompanying notes 75–79 (noting personhood concerns).
308. See infra Part V.C.2 (discussing relievings).
309. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 986–
88 (1982) (distinguishing property that is personal in nature from that which is fungible).
Thanks to Eduardo Peñalver for comments on this point.
310. See supra notes 16, 19 and accompanying text (discussing these remedies).
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inflict social costs. These observations suggest the utility of the converse
of forcings, relievings.
2. Relievings. — Forcings presuppose a situation in which ownership
is socially valuable but privately burdensome. Yet many situations in
which ownership is compelled actually involve social as well as private
costs. Offering a way out of ownership holds social value to the extent it
relieves those who are ill suited to bear the associated risks or make the
necessary decisions. If ending ownership would be a Pareto improvement, why does it not happen? To observe that there is currently no
established mechanism through which unwilling owners can be readily
relieved of ownership only begs the question.
The law does at times exhibit a sensitivity to the costs of ownership
and the realities of being forced to continue bearing its burdens. For
example, In re Pratt, a First Circuit case, involved a Chevy Cavalier
financed by General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) that
GMAC refused to repossess after a debtor in bankruptcy surrendered
it.311 No junkyard would accept the now-worthless car without a lien release from GMAC, but GMAC would not release the lien.312 The owners,
the court found, “were confronted with the grim prospect of retaining
indefinite possession of a worthless vehicle unless they paid the GMAC
loan balance, together with all the attendant costs of possessing, maintaining, insuring, and/or garaging the vehicle.”313 It held that GMAC’s
actions, even if permitted under state law, were “coercive” in effect and
thus in contravention of the discharge injunction under bankruptcy
law.314
What the court did in Pratt amounted to a relieving, though it was
not given that name. But relievings are relatively uncommon. Why?
Clearly there are costs associated with providing relief from ownership.
Beyond administrative costs, such a system would potentially saddle government with ownership it does not want, or with the costs of inducing
(or forcing) another party to take up ownership. But suppose some
relievings would produce net gains, despite their costs. The problem may
be that it is deemed normatively inappropriate for society to bear the
costs associated with the relieving—both the costs of administering the
system, and the costs that ending ownership will impose, including
311. 462 F.3d 14, 15–16 (1st Cir. 2006).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 20.
314. Id. at 19–20. Underwater homes on which lenders have refused to foreclose can
present similar conundrums. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text (discussing
unwanted retention in defaulting mortgagor context). Compare In re Pigg, 453 B.R. 728
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (ordering sale where debtor had surrendered property
following flood but mortgagee would not foreclose or accept deed in lieu of foreclosure),
with In re Fristoe, No. 10-32887, 2012 WL 4483891, at *4 (D. Utah Sept. 27, 2012)
(disagreeing with reasoning in Pigg and finding bankruptcy court lacked power to order
sale without lender’s consent).
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heightened information costs, the costs of retransferring the property,
and so on.
This is where the idea of chargeable relievings comes in. Just as
there may be cases where the social value of ownership does not line up
with the distributive fairness of imposing ownership’s burdens, there may
be cases where the social costs of ending ownership do not line up with
the distributive fairness of relieving the owner of the related burdens.
Compensated forcings on the one hand and chargeable relievings on the
other can accommodate these misalignments. On reflection, the idea of
a chargeable relieving is not odd at all. Relievings amount to put options
against the government; decisions about the charges that will accompany
them simply amount to selecting the strike price.
Put options against the government have been offered in relatively
limited situations, such as the buyback of guns,315 gas-guzzling
“clunkers,”316 and fishing boats.317 But they might be offered more
broadly.318 As already suggested, one especially promising application
would enable would-be abandoners to rid themselves of their property in
an orderly manner by paying the costs that their termination of ownership imposes.319 Similarly, a tortfeasor subject to trover could be allowed
to avoid forced ownership by paying the costs of appraising the damage.
Such an approach would allow a party to transform her position from
outcome-bearer to damage-payer. Thus, relievings can often constitute a
complementary strategy to—or an escape hatch from—forcings.
CONCLUSION
Government coercion can be used to impose or prolong private
ownership, just as it can be used to cut it short. Yet forcings are a form of
government compulsion that has not been systematically explored,
despite the evident connections to existing bodies of literature. One
might contend that this neglect is appropriate because the real-world
domain of forcings is likely to be limited or nonexistent for normative or
practical reasons. But that claim cannot be evaluated until we recognize
the category itself. Doing so directs attention to existing forms of forced
315. See Morris, supra note 6, at 854–55 (discussing gun buybacks as examples of put
options).
316. See generally Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, The Effects of Fiscal Stimulus: Evidence
from the 2009 “Cash for Clunkers” Program, 127 Q.J. Econ. 1107 (2013) (studying impact
of 2009 “Cash for Clunkers” program that enabled U.S. motorists to turn in fuelinefficient cars for destruction in exchange for credit against certain new vehicle
purchases).
317. See, e.g., L.S. Parsons, Management of Marine Fisheries in Canada 191–92
(1993) (assessing fishing license buyback programs).
318. See, e.g., Fennell, Alienability, supra note 9, at 1457–59 (discussing use of put
options in conjunction with alienability limits).
319. See generally Strahilevitz, Right to Abandon, supra note 7 (examining costs of
abandonment and exploring ways to address them).
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or pressured ownership, and prompts exploration of the reasons behind
them and the limits on them.
Recognizing forcings as a category focuses new attention on how
ownership, as a mechanism for assigning actual rather than expected
outcomes, can hold social value even when it proves privately burdensome. The ability to save on information costs, to allocate risk, and to
align incentives may motivate choices to compel ownership over the
objections of the owner herself. Of course, forced ownership will rarely
be the best answer; there are typically other alternatives that can serve
the relevant social purposes at lower cost. Isolating the conditions that
could call for the imposition of ownership shows not only how forcings
might be extended but also where existing forms of involuntary ownership might be replaced with less coercive alternatives. Finding the niche
that forcings occupy on the slate of policy alternatives also illuminates
another unappreciated domain for governmental action—that of relieving owners of burdensome ownership.

